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PROPAGANDA WARFARE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Sara L. Ochs*

I. Introduction
Propaganda warfare, while novel in nomenclature, is far from new in
practice. In an era dominated by constant news, battles for public opinion
1
complement physical attacks. In fact, “winning modern wars is as much
dependent on carrying domestic and international public opinion as it is on
2
defeating the enemy on the battlefield.” The fight for public opinion has
become so valuable to military initiatives that the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual specifically recognizes propaganda directed to3
wards “civilian or neutral audiences” as a “permissible means of war.”
While propaganda warfare on public opinion was once reserved for military use against state enemies, governments have recently adapted this tactic to target judicial entities seeking to prosecute violations of international
criminal laws. State leaders have begun using social media, press statements, and televised conferences to spread disinformation in efforts to demonize entities, like international courts, for investigating and prosecuting
their state nationals. And while the precise means of disseminating this
propaganda varies by state, the motivation behind the attacks is the same: to
convert public opinion against the targeted court to prevent the prosecution
of state officials and military leaders. Within the context of the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), this article defines propaganda warfare as states

*
Sara L. Ochs is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Louisville, Louis
D. Brandeis School of Law. This article was greatly improved by the comments and feedback
provided by my colleagues at Brandeis Law, as well as the participants of the 2020 Chicagoland Junior Scholars Conference, the American Society of International Law 2020 Midyear
Meeting Research Forum, and the 2021 Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting’s New Voices in Human Rights Panel, especially Professors Stuart Ford, David Stewart,
Zachary Kaufman, Andrew Keane Woods, and Jeffrey Omari. I would also like to express my
sincere gratitude to my inimitable research assistant, Amber Cain.
1.
Laurie R. Blank, Media Warfare, Propaganda, and the Law of War, in CYBER
WARFARE, MEDIA WARFARE, AND LAWFARE 88, 88 (Michael L. Gross & Tamar Meisels
eds., 2017) (recognizing that “battle[s] of words” pertaining to legality and legitimacy of military action “often seem to be as important as military capabilities”).
2.
Kenneth Payne, The Media as an Instrument of War, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q.:
PARAMETERS, Spring 2005, at 81, 81.
3.
OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF
WAR MANUAL, 331 art. 5.26.1-1.2 (2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs
/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%
202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter “DoD Law of War Manual”].
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leaders’ systematic and highly publicized use of anti-ICC rhetoric and disinformation about the ICC, its functions, and its jurisdictional reach.
The ICC is by no means the only international entity to bear the brunt of
propaganda warfare. However, the ICC, as a treaty-based court lacking an
enforcement mechanism, is critically dependent on public legitimacy and
4
state support. Without this support, the ICC bears little chance of satisfactorily completing its mandate to hold individuals accountable “for the most
5
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” Indeed, a widespread lack of public legitimacy in recent years has repeatedly
6
precluded the ICC from achieving case-specific goals. As a court founded
upon state support, attacks aimed to deprive the ICC of legitimacy in the
eyes of its state supporters are particularly damaging. In ratifying the Rome
Statute, which established the ICC, states voluntarily forfeited a portion of
their state sovereignty and permitted the ICC to hold their nationals, including their government leaders, accountable. Yet, as a direct result of this consent-based system, states retain significant involvement and control over
7
ICC operations, and the ICC is critically dependent on states’ cooperation.
Historically, investigations without state support have proven especially
challenging for the ICC, and on a rudimentary level, the ICC’s success in
any particular case can often be linked to the level of State cooperation it
8
received in investigating that matter.
Successful propaganda wars against the ICC, such as the Kenyan Government’s widespread campaign labeling the ICC as a neo-colonialist regime, have proven debilitating for the ICC. What started as a strategy to
avoid the prosecution of high-ranking Kenyan state leaders, prompted a
widespread anti-ICC movement supported by the African Union that ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of several African states from the Rome

4.
Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with
the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 767, 767 (2002).
5.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6.
Yvonne M. Dutton, Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International Criminal
Court’s Domestic Perception Challenge, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 76 (2017). See
generally Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement
Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar al Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584
(2011) (explaining how states’ failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir while present on their state territory undermined the International Criminal Court’s (“ICC’s”) prosecution of Sudanese crimes against humanity).
7.
Oosterveld et al., supra note 4, at 767 (foreshadowing that the ICC’s success
would “be determined by the level of cooperation it receives from States”).
8.
ASP 2017: State Cooperation Crucial for an Effective ICC, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM.
CT. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20171107/asp-2017-statecooperation-crucial-effective-icc#:~:text=With%20no%20enforcement%20mechanism%20of,
to%20cooperate%20with%20the%20ICC (highlighting the detrimental impact on investigations of state non-cooperation by explaining the challenges the ICC Prosecutor has faced in
investigating crimes within the Situation in Darfur, Sudan).

Summer 2021]

Propaganda Warfare on the International Criminal Court

583

Statute. At the time of publication, the ICC is still working to distance itself
9
from claims of discrimination against African nations.
The impact of these propaganda wars runs deeper than mere public image. Often, the use of propaganda and disinformation, combined with the
ICC’s critical need for state support and cooperation, is sufficient to coerce
the ICC to reach a certain ruling or to redirect its limited resources to a different issue. Propaganda wars that are successful in provoking the ICC to
dismiss claims against high-profile leaders inject the appearance of bias into
ICC operations and inspire other states to act against the Court to prevent
investigations into their nationals. The most influential states on the geopolitical stage are also the states with the most influence on global perception.
These states include the United States, Russia, and China, all of whom refused to join the ICC out of fear of the infringement of their sovereignty.
These states also hold permanent status and veto power on the United Nations Security Council and are therefore influential in situations where the
10
Security Council refers non-States Parties to the ICC. And, as seen recently by the United States’ vitriolic response to the ICC’s opening of an investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan, which threatens to implicate
U.S. officials, powerful states will aggressively utilize propaganda and disinformation to prevent the ICC from prosecuting their or their allies’ nation11
als. These propaganda wars, and the ICC’s vulnerability to them, thus carry the risk of exacerbating already significant power disparities in the field
of international criminal justice. They further represent the danger that the
ICC will become a court that exclusively tries perpetrators from nations too
powerless to fight back, while leaving superpowers, like the United States
and China, immune from prosecution for atrocities committed on their soil
and by their nationals.
Many scholars have addressed the pervasive role politics plays in the
12
ICC’s operations, and a significant body of scholarship has explored the

9.
See generally Geoff Dancy, Yvonne Marie Dutton, Tessa Alleblas & Eamon
Aloyo, What Determines Perceptions of Bias Toward the International Criminal Court? Evidence from Kenya, 64(7-8) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1443 (2019) (recognizing ongoing perceptions of anti-African bias in the ICC).
10.
The UN Security Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council (noting that the United States, Russia,
and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus hold the power to
veto any Security Council resolution); Alexandre Skander Galand, The Nature of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and its Amended Jurisdictional Scheme, 17 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 933, 937–38 (2020) (discussing the role of the Security Council in referring
situations to the ICC that generally fall outside of its territorial jurisdiction).
11.
See infra Part IV.
12.
See generally OUMAR BA, STATES OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2020) (exploring the relationship between weaker States
Parties and the ICC, and the intersection of power and politics); Christof Royer, The Bête
Noire and the Noble Lie: The International Criminal Court and (the Disavowal of) Politics,
13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 225 (2019) (presenting the ICC as a political actor).
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13

importance of legitimacy in ICC functions. However, the use of propaganda warfare, in the form of disinformation and anti-ICC campaigns, and its
impact on public opinion—which lies at the crossroads between politics and
14
legitimacy—has been largely unexplored. This article seeks to fill that gap
by examining the extent to which propaganda wars impact the ICC’s decisions and operations. Notably, this article is not intended to read as a critique of how the ICC and its Prosecutor have handled politically sensitive
situations in the past. Nor is it intended to provide a comprehensive over15
view of every propaganda war leveled against the ICC. Rather, through the
use of two case studies—those of the Kenyan and United States governments—it aims to identify the extent to which the ICC has had to modify its
operations in order to sustain the public legitimacy necessary to fulfill its
mandate.
This article argues that the effective use of propaganda warfare against
the ICC has the potential to destroy the ICC’s ability to effectively investigate and prosecute the crimes of most concern to the international community. It further suggests that in order to successfully defend against propaganda attacks, like those orchestrated by the Kenyan and United States govgovernments, the ICC must adapt its approach to state relations to foster
knowledge of, support for, and cooperation with the ICC’s goals and prosecutorial strategies. The article ultimately seeks to identify workable proposals for the ICC and its Prosecutor to strengthen the ICC’s perceived legitimacy among states parties and non-states parties alike, so as to minimize
the detrimental impact posed by state propaganda.
Part II of this article will identify the foundational characteristics of the
ICC that render propaganda wars so consequential to its operations, espe-

13.
See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400 (2009); Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success
of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405 (2012).
14.
See Harry M. Rhea & Ryan C. Meldrum, United States Public Support for the International Criminal Court: A Multivariate Analysis of Attitudes and Attributes, 37 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 739, 741 (2015) (noting that “little has been written on public opinion and the ICC”).
15.
Specifically, this paper will not discuss the ongoing propaganda war being fought
by the Philippines in response to the ICC Prosecutor’s propio motu preliminary examination
into President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs.” See The Philippines’ Membership in the ICC
Comes to an End, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 15, 2019),
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190315/philippines-leaves-icc (explaining how the
Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute as part of its propaganda campaign against the
Court). Nor will it analyze in detail Israel’s current battle in response to the Prosecutor’s investigation into crimes committed in Palestine. See Jeffrey Heller, Netanyahu Accuses ICC of
Anti-Semitism in Pursuit of War Crimes Probe, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icc-palestinians-israel/netanyahu-accuses-icc-of-antisemitism-in-pursuit-of-war-crimes-probe-idUSKBN1YQ0KC (recognizing Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu’s accusation that the ICC is anti-Semitic in response to the Prosecutor’s
preliminary examination in Palestine).
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cially its reliance on state cooperation and its susceptibility to political pressures.
Part III will examine how the Kenyan Government’s highly publicized
response to the ICC cases against William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta marshalled public opinion against the ICC both within Kenya and throughout
the African Union. Next, it will analyze how this campaign not only pressured the ICC into dismissing the charges against the two high profile defendants, but also sparked a regional revolution of public opinion against the
ICC, the effects of which are still very apparent today.
Part IV will explore the United States’ ongoing propaganda war against
the ICC instituted in response to the Prosecutor’s opening of an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan. It will specifically analyze the extent to which a non-State Party superpower can bully the ICC into authoring favorable opinions by combining an
anti-ICC public opinion campaign with a lack of investigatory cooperation.
It will further consider the potentially devastating legacy that this may have
on the ICC.
Part V argues that cultivating greater perceived legitimacy of the ICC,
both within and outside its States Parties, will provide the ICC with some
immunity from attempted propaganda wars. Specifically, it advocates for
more significant, sustained public outreach to foster knowledge and respect
for the ICC; the ICC’s enhancement of its public image; and the implementation of punitive consequences for States Parties who fail to comply with
ICC investigations.

II. The ICC’s Susceptibility to Propaganda
Given the unique foundations upon which the ICC is grounded, the ICC
is especially vulnerable to both political pressures and widespread public
opinion. By signing the Rome Statute, each State Party provided the ICC
with jurisdiction over core crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war
16
crimes, and the crime of aggression —committed on their state territory or
17
by their nationals elsewhere in the world. The Rome Statute does not recognize sovereign immunity, meaning that high-ranking governmental officials, including heads of state, may be subject to ICC investigation and
18
prosecution.
16.
The term “core crimes” pertains to the four categories of crimes listed in article 5 of
the Rome Statute. Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 769, 769–70 (Kevin Jon
Heller, Frédéric Mégret, Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Jens David Ohlin & Darryl Robinson eds.,
2020).
17.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 12, ¶¶ 1–2; Yvonne M. Dutton, Explaining State
Commitment to the International Criminal Court: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a
Credible Threat, 10 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 477, 478 (2011).
18.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 27; see also Paul J. Toner, Competing Concepts of
Immunity: The (R)evolution of the Head of State Immunity Defense, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV.
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So long as other jurisdictional requirements are met, the ICC may be20
come apprised of a particular matter through three different means. First, a
State Party may refer a situation occurring in its own territory or in the terri21
tory of another State Party. Second, and most controversially, the ICC
Prosecutor may, on its own propio motu authority vested under article 15 of
the Rome Statute, and with approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber, initiate in22
vestigations into certain situations. Under both of these methods, the ICC’s
jurisdiction is geographically limited to crimes committed on the territory or
23
by a national of a State Party. Third, the United Nations Security Council
may refer situations to the Prosecutor under authority provided by Chapter
24
VII of the Charter of the United Nations. For situations opened pursuant to
Security Council referral, the ICC’s jurisdiction is not geographically limited. The Security Council may refer a matter involving crimes committed
anywhere or by anyone in the world, regardless of whether these crimes
were committed on the territory of a non-State Party or by a non-State Party
25
national.
The ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction and a self-recognized “court
26
of last resort,” meaning it will only step in to prosecute crimes that a state
27
lacks either the means or desire to prosecute. This concept, recognized as
the principle of complementarity, is codified in the Rome Statute and provides that a case will be deemed inadmissible before the ICC when it is “investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution,” or when it has been investigated by a State, and the State decided
not to prosecute, “unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or in-

899, 901 (2004) (recognizing that the Rome Statute does not provide for a Head of State immunity defense).
19.
Article 11 also limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after the entry into
force of the Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 11; see also Christian M. De Vos, The
International Criminal Court: Between Law and Politics in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
IN CONTEXT 240, 243 (Philipp Kastner ed. 2018) (discussing the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Rome Statute).
20.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 13.
21.
Id. art. 14.
22.
Id. art. 15.
23.
Id. art. 12(2).
24.
Id. art. 13(b).
25.
Oona A. Hathaway, Paul K. Strauch, Beatrice A. Walton & Zoe A. Y. Weinberg,
What is a War Crime? 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 53, 95 (2019); Galand, supra note 10.
26.
About the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int
/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
27.
Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 1 (recognizing that the ICC “shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”). Additionally, the ICC will only deem situations to be admissible that do not rise to a level of “sufficient gravity to justify further action
by the Court.” Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(d).
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28

ability of the State genuinely to prosecute.” The principle is intended to
29
recognize the ICC’s respect for states’ primary jurisdiction. And while
measures like the ICC’s limited jurisdiction and the principle of complementarity are designed to facilitate voluntary state involvement in the ICC,
the ICC has routinely struggled to balance two fundamental weaknesses: its
extreme reliance on the cooperation of its States Parties and its susceptibility to political pressure from States Parties and non-States Parties alike.

A. Reliance on State Cooperation
Nearly two decades after the ICC’s creation in 2002, 123 nations rati30
fied the Rome Statute and became States Parties to the ICC. States Parties’
obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions
31
of crimes is expressly codified in the Rome Statute. This obligation extends through all stages of investigation and court proceedings and requires
32
states to, among other things, perform provisional arrests, facilitate the appearance of witnesses and experts in court, execute searches and seizures,
33
provide witness and victim protection, and question suspects. This requested level of cooperation is especially vital, as the ICC lacks a typical
enforcement mechanism. It has no police force or military unit by which to
enforce its judgments, warrants, or summons, and as such, the ICC “de34
pends on the political will of countries to cooperate with the ICC.” As
former ICC Judge Hans-Peter Kaul accurately summarized in a 2011 keynote address, “[t]he ICC is absolutely, one hundred percent, dependent on
35
effective cooperation with States Parties.”

Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a)–(b.).
XABIER AGIRRE, ANTONIO CASSESE, ROLF EINAR FIFE, HÅKAN FRIMAN,
CHRISTOPHER K. HALL, JOHN T. HOLMES, JANN KLEFFNER, HECTOR OLASOLO, NORUL H.
RASHID, DARRYL ROBINSON, ELIZABETH WILMSHURST & ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN,
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2003),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984
/complementarity.pdf. The complementarity principle also seeks to promote the effectiveness
and efficiency of investigations and prosecutions, because states are often in the best position
to prosecute given their access to evidence and witnesses. De Vos, supra note 19, at 241.
30.
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int
/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20
statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
31.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 86.
32.
Id. art. 92.
33.
Id. art. 93(1).
34.
Danial Kaysi & Charles Faint, Political Will and Multilateral Cooperation in International Justice: An Interview with Richard Goldstone, 7 YALE J. INT’L AFFS. 90, 91 (2012);
see Roy S. Lee, States’ Responses: Issues and Solutions, in STATES’ RESPONSES TO ISSUES
ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE: CONSTITUTIONAL, SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL
COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2005).
35.
H.E. Judge Dr. jur. h. c. Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice President Int’l Crim. Ct.,
Keynote: The International Criminal Court—Current Challenges and Perspectives 8 (Aug. 8,
28.
29.
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If a State Party fails to comply with a request from the ICC to cooperate, pursuant to Rome Statute article 87, the ICC may refer the State Party to
the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council, in the event the noncompliance occurs within the context of a Security-Council referred mat36
ter. Yet, the Rome Statute lacks any defined repercussions that may com37
plement this type of referral. Thus, while article 87 appears to carry a
heavy punishment, its bark has proven far worse than its bite, and the actual
consequences faced by non-compliant parties have essentially been limited
38
to public shaming. As the prolific ICC expert Judge Richard Goldstone has
noted, if States Parties refuse to cooperate, “there is nothing the court can do
39
other than to make noise.”
State cooperation is intrinsically connected to the ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Although the term “legitimacy” is often used to broadly refer to
“generalized acceptability or success,” a vast field of critical scholarship has
categorized varying areas of legitimacy in the context of international
40
courts. And while there is often a disconnect between sociological legitimacy—“what people perceive to be morally or legally legitimate”—and
41
normative legitimacy—“what really is legally or morally legitimate” —this
distinction is well beyond the scope of the present article. This article’s use
of the term “legitimacy” will refer only to the sociological “perceived legitimacy” of the ICC, or how people and states subjectively perceive the legit42
imacy of operations and justifications for the ICC.
Despite these highly philosophical underpinnings, the ICC’s need for
legitimacy is practically evident. States’ “perceptions of the ICC’s legitima43
cy affect their willingness to cooperate with the ICC.” States and their nationals are more willing to support an institution that they believe operates
fairly and effectively and are less willing to support a court perceived as bi-

2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740
/010911salzburglawschool.pdf [hereinafter Judge Kaul Keynote Address].
36.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7).
37.
Barnes, supra note 6, at 1616–17.
38.
See Nada Ali, Bringing the Guilty to Justice: Can the ICC be Self-Enforcing? 14
CHI. J. INT’L L. 408, 416 (2014) (noting that the Rome Statute lacks an “enforcement bite” to
compel state cooperation).
39.
Kaysi & Faint, supra note 34, at 91.
40.
deGuzman, supra note 13, at 1436–37 (identifying three categories of legitimacy:
legal legitimacy, which anticipates the “correct application of laws and legal principles”; moral legitimacy, which “refers to the moral justifiability of a judicial regime or decision”; and
sociological legitimacy, which “considers the perceptions of relevant audiences that such regime or decision is justified”).
41.
Id. at 1437 (quoting Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1851 (2005)) (emphasis added).
42.
Ford, supra note 13, at 406–07 n.1. This specific type of legitimacy falls within the
broader category of “sociological legitimacy.” See deGuzman, supra note 13, at 1437.
43.
C. Cora True-Frost, Weapons of the Weak: The Prosecutor of the ICC’s Power to
Engage the UN Security Council, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 261, 315 (2016).
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44

ased, ineffective, or weak. In democratic states, where governments are—
at least theoretically—guided by their constituents’ needs, public opinion
and support can directly influence state action on deciding whether to support an ICC investigation.

B. Vulnerability to Political Pressures
As a treaty-based court designed to mete out international criminal jus45
tice, the ICC is grounded in politics. Since the ICC is designed to impose
individual criminal liability on those responsible for masterminding crimes
such as genocide and crimes against humanity, its defendants are often state
actors and high-ranking governmental officials, thus creating sensitive geo46
political situations. While the ICC is not an organ of the United Nations
(“U.N.”), it holds close relationships with purely political entities, most notably the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council can refer cases to the
ICC and even suspend ongoing ICC investigations on any case it deems “a
47
threat to international peace and security.” This relationship, along with
the composition of the ICC’s States Parties and the types of disputes over
which the ICC has jurisdiction, inherently inserts a level of politics into the
48
ICC’s justice agenda.
Many scholars have weighed in on the prevalence of politics in ICC op49
erations. While ICC Prosecutors and representatives of the court have re-

44.
Dutton, supra note 6, at 85.
45.
Treaties and other international agreements require international cooperation by
their signatories in order to be effective; treaties are only likely to be successful when they
achieve “political buy-in” from their signatories’ governments. Emily O’Brien & Richard
Gowan, What Makes International Agreements Work 3 (N.Y.U. Ctr. on Int’l Coop. ed.,
Sept. 2012),
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files
/7839.pdf; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES (2012) (recognizing that
the “political dimensions [of international criminal justice] are inescapable”).
46.
Westen K. Shilaho, The International Criminal Court and the African Union, 18
AFR. J. ON CONFLICT RESOL. 119 (2018).
47.
Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, Law and Politics at the International Criminal Court,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrightsopenpage/law-and-politics-at-international-criminal-court; see also Beth Van Schaack, Deconstructing Syria’s Would-be International Criminal Court Referral: The Politics of International Justice, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2020) (explaining that the Rome Statute grants the
Security Council the ability to refer and defer investigations and cases; compel state cooperation; and “make a determination that a state committed an act of aggression”).
48.
BA, supra note 12, at 65–66; see also Olugbuo, supra note 47 (noting that “although the ICC is a legal institution, it is surrounded by political actors”).
49.
See, e.g., Sascha Dominik, Dov Bachmann & Eda Luke Nwibo, Pull and Push—
Implementing the Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC Within the African Union: Opportunities and Challenges, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 457, 520 (2018) (recognizing that while justice may not be a political tool, it “cannot, in practical terms, be completely
isolated from the politics of those advancing its cause”); H. Christie, The Poisoned Chalice:
Imperial Justice, Moral Relativism, and the origins of International Criminal Law, 72 U.
PITT. L. REV. 361, 365 (2010) (opining that political influence is “inherent in the very nature”
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peatedly disavowed the notion that politics plays any role in prosecutorial or
50
judicial operations, this apolitical façade is unrealistic. In fact, in a statement now out of character for the outwardly apolitical ICC, Judge EboeOsuji recognized that the view “that international law is capable of operating in a politically sterile environment implicates amazing naiveté as to how
51
life really works.” Given the nature of the crimes, the defendants falling
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and the incessant interweaving of government
involvement in the creation and operations of the ICC, it is disingenuous for
the field of international criminal law to attempt to remove itself entirely
from political pressures.
While the ICC boasts a long list of States Parties that carry influence on
the geopolitical stage, several of those nations who hold the most political
power over the ICC—The United States, Russia, and China—are absent
52
from that list. Although all three nations have been past supporters of international criminal justice initiatives, such as ad hoc and hybrid courts designed to prosecute atrocity crimes in countries like Rwanda, the Former
Yugoslavia, and Cambodia, none have proven willing to join the Rome
53
Statute. The reasons for this are unsurprising: As a permanent, treatybased international court, the ICC is starkly different from these previous
courts. The ICC provides far less of a shield against superpowers, and the

of international criminal law, and it is impossible to divorce justice for war crimes or crimes
against humanity entirely from the “political element”); BA, supra note 12, at 5 (“[T]he ICC is
inherently a political institution that makes the distinction between friends and enemies of the
international community.”).
50.
See, e.g., Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 942
(2011) (referencing a keynote address made by former ICC Prosecutor, Luis MorenoOcampo, in which he claimed, “I apply the law without political considerations. But the other
actors have to adjust to the law.”); Thomas Obel Hansen, The International Criminal Court
and the Legitimacy of Exercise, in LAW AND LEGITIMACY 5, 7 (Per Andersen, Cecilie
Eriksen, & Bjarke Viskum eds., 2015) (referring to statements made by the former ICC President in which he noted the absence of a “shred of evidence . . . that the court has done anything political,” and by current ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, in which she claimed “the
Prosecutor does not take into account any political considerations” in determining whether to
open an investigation); Benjamin Duerr, Twenty Years On: The ICC and the Politicization of
its Mechanisms, IPI GLOB. OBSERVATORY (Aug. 7, 2018), https://theglobalobservatory.org
/2018/08/twenty-years-icc-politicization-mechanisms (arguing that while the ICC holds itself
out as a purely legal and apolitical body, in actuality, it is “carefully balancing the ideal—an
apolitical approach merely based on the law—and a more realistic approach, thus, accommodating the interests of the governments involved”).
51.
Hansen, supra note 50, at 13 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-01/111334-Anx-Corr, Separate Further Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 11 (Oct. 21, 2013)).
52.
De Vos, supra note 19, at 253–54.
53.
ERNA PARIS, THE SUN CLIMBS SLOW 49–51 (2008) (recognizing U.S. support of
international criminal justice ventures prior to the Rome Conference, such as the creation of
the ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the establishment of
international hybrid tribunals to prosecute atrocities committed in Cambodia, East Timor, and
Sierra Leone).
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crimes that fall within the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction—genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression—often implicate superpowers
54
and their allies. These powerful nations are willing to provide selective
support of international criminal tribunals so long as the tribunals complement their national interests, but none are willing to support an initiative by
55
which its leaders or government officials may be held accountable.
The United States, Russia, and China all serve as permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council and carry veto power over Security Council
56
decisions. Thus, even though each nation has refused to ratify the Rome
Statute and join the ICC, they nonetheless hold great weight in deciding
which cases the ICC hears, especially those involving crimes committed on
non-States Parties’ territories. It should also be noted that non-States Parties,
including these three nations, have no legal obligation to cooperate with or
57
support the ICC.
The level of power non-States Parties hold over the ICC is more than
just theoretical. As Judge Kaul has noted, we live in a “challenging reality”
in which “powerful States and permanent members of the Security Council .
. . . somehow [instrumentalize] the ICC, to use it for their political purposes
58
and interests.” Indeed, to date, the Security Council has referred only two
59
situations to the ICC—Darfur and Libya —and China and Russia have re60
peatedly vetoed attempts to refer the situation in Syria. Political maneuverings both within and surrounding the ICC, have come to a head in recent
years, in large part due to the Prosecutor’s increased use of her propio motu
authority to open cases and the ICC’s expanding reach over cases implicat-

54.
See Kaysi & Faint, supra note 34, at 92 (noting the United States perspective that
“international justice is a great idea for the rest of the world but not such a good idea when it
comes to home”).
55.
Id. at 92 (recognizing Judge Richard Goldston’s view that “The powerful don’t like
oversight, [they] don’t like being policed . . . [and they] don’t like smaller nations judging
their military and civilian leaders.”).
56.
Voting System, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content
/voting-system (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
57.
Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to
the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the
International Court’s Functions and Status, 24 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 650, 654–55 (2006).
58.
Judge Kaul Keynote Address, supra note 35, at 9–10; see also Jonathan Paul
Bracewell, Will it Float? The International Criminal Court Without the United States, 6
REGENT J. INT’L L. 483, 504 (2008) (explaining that the United States argued for greater Security Council control over the Court during the negotiations for the Rome Statute so that the
U.S. could establish lasting control over the Court).
59.
In Hindsight: The Security Council and the International Criminal Court, SEC.
COUNCIL REP. (Jul. 31, 2018), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/201808/in_hindsight_the_security_council_and_the_international_criminal_court.php.
60.
U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014) (reflecting China and Russia’s May 22, 2014 veto of resolution to refer the Syrian situation to the
ICC).
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ing world powers, including the opening of situations into crimes committed
in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

III. The Situation in Kenya
The ICC’s Situation in Kenya is notable for many reasons. It marked
the first time that a state challenged the admissibility of a case on comple61
mentarity grounds, and it was also the first investigation opened by the
62
ICC Prosecutor propio motu. This marked a significant shift in the ICC
and specifically the Prosecutor’s strategy. Up until this point, all of the situations handled by the ICC, including those in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, had been referred to the
63
ICC by the states themselves. As a result, the Prosecutor had prior assurance of some cooperation in conducting its investigations in these self64
referred situations. This radically changed with the Situation in Kenya,
where Kenyan leaders refused to cooperate and actively sought to undermine the Prosecutor’s investigation. This lack of cooperation, complemented by an anti-ICC propaganda war deftly spearheaded by defendants and
current Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William
65
Ruto, resulted in the dismissal of all charges against all named defendants.
Not only did propaganda successfully prompt the dismissal of these charges,
but it ultimately marred the ICC’s legitimacy in Africa and globally, sparking a backlash from which the ICC has yet to fully recover.

A. Background of the Situation in Kenya
The Situation in Kenya stems from violence committed in the wake of
the country’s December 2007 election. The election, as typical for Kenyan
66
political elections, fell along ethnic lines, pitting the incumbent Mwai
Kibaki, a member of Kenya’s Kikuyu tribe, against Raila Odinga, an ethnic

61.
Christopher Totten, Hina Asghar & Ayomipo Ojutalayo, The ICC Kenya Case: Implications and Impact for Propio Motu and Complementarity, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L.
REV. 699, 700 (2014).
62.
Simeon P. Sungi, The Kenyan Cases and the Future of the International Criminal
Court’s Prosecutorial Policies, 2 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 153, 153 (2015).
63.
BA, supra note 12, at 92.
64.
Id. at 92.
65.
Anjli Parrin, Kenya ICC Case Dismissed for Lack for Evidence, Declared a Mistrial, COLUMBIA L. SCH.: HUM. RTS. INST. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/humanrights-institute/news-features/press-releases/kenya-icc-case-dismissed-lack-evidencedeclared-mistrial (noting that the dismissal of the case against Ruto terminated the “sole remaining Kenya case” before the Court).
66.
BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND KENYA’S CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 17 (Hum. Rts. Watch ed., Mar. 2008), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files
/reports/kenya0308web.pdf [hereinafter BALLOTS TO BULLETS] (recognizing that “the political manipulation of ethnicity is almost a tradition in Kenyan politics”).
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67

rival of Kibaki. Following what appeared to be election rigging to ensure
68
Kibaki’s victory, violence—much of which was likely pre-planned—broke
69
out throughout Kenya’s Rift Valley. Death squads targeted Kikuyus and
70
sparked retaliatory violence. The violence expanded throughout the nation,
and by its conclusion in February 2008, over 1,000 people had been killed,
900 were raped or sexually brutalized, 3,500 were seriously injured, and
71
350,000 people had been forcibly displaced.
In 2008, the Kenyan Government established a Commission of Inquiry
72
on Post-Election Violence. In its October 2008 report, following a thorough investigation, the Commission presented its recommendations for
achieving justice. These included the creation of a special tribunal, a hybrid
court intended to sit within Kenya with both Kenyan and international judges, investigators, and staff, so as to ensure independent impartiality in the
73
tribunal investigations and prosecutions. This proposal stemmed from the
Commission’s acknowledgment that the governmental institutions within
74
Kenya, including the judiciary, “were not impartial and lacked integrity.”
In February 2009, the Kenyan Parliament voted against the proposal for a
75
special tribunal. The result was not unexpected, as many members of Par-

67.
James Verini, The Prosecutor and the President, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-court-morenoocampo-the-prosecutor-and-the-president.html?smid=tw-share&_r=2.
68.
Totten, supra note 61, at 704–05.
69.
Id. at 705.
70.
Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics,
the Election, and the Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD., no. 1, 2014, at 25, 27.
71.
Kenya, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
As with most periods of extensive violence, the precise calculations of the numbers of individuals killed, injured, or displaced are in dispute. See, e.g., BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra
note 66, at 2 (stating that over 1,000 were killed and up to 500,000 internally displaced as a
result of the post-election violence); Verini, supra note 67 (placing these figures even higher;
estimating that between 1,100 and 1,200 individuals were killed and a half a million people
were displaced as a result of the violence).
72.
Specifically, the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (more commonly known as the “Waki Commission”), as well as a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission were created as a product of the power-sharing agreement negotiated by former U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Totten, supra note 61, at 706–07; The Kenyan Commission of
Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST.,
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialogue-Inquiry-2008-English.pdf (last
visited Sept. 1, 2020).
73.
TRUTH, JUST., & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY-CIPEV
REPORT (WAKI REPORT) 472–75 (2008), https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov [hereinafter WAKI REPORT].
74.
Id. at 28.
75.
Timeline, INT’L JUST. MONITOR, https://www.ijmonitor.org/kenya-cases-timeline
(last visited Sept. 8, 2020); Verini, supra note 67.
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liament were believed to have been directly involved in orchestrating the
76
violence.
In light of Kenya’s failure to create the proposed Special Tribunal or to
conduct objectively satisfactory domestic trials against those allegedly responsible for the post-election violence, the Commission delivered its evidence, including a list of suspects implicated in the violence, directly to the
77
ICC’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. Based on this evidence,
Ocampo chose to open the Situation into the violence on his own authori78
ty. Given that he opened the investigation propio motu, he was obligated
pursuant to Rome Statute article 15 to first request and obtain authorization
79
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed with the investigation, which Pre80
Trial Chamber II granted in March 2010.
In March 2011, upon Ocampo’s request, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a
81
summons for six defendants to be tried in two separate cases. Notable
among the defendants were Uhuru Kenyatta, who served as Kenya’s Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and who is the son of Kenya’s first
82
83
president, and William Ruto, a Kenyan Parliamentarian. Kenyatta was
charged, based on allegations that he provided institutional support for the
post-election violence, with five counts of crimes against humanity for murder, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, persecution, and other inhumane
84
acts. Ocampo also charged Ruto as an indirect perpetrator with three
charges of crimes against humanity for murder, deportation or forcible

76.
Verini, supra note 67.
77.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Waki Commission List of Names in the Hands of
ICC Prosecutor (Jul. 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr439; Kenya,
COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/kenya (last visited
Sept. 1, 2020).
78.
Yvonne M. Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of (Non) Compliance
from Kenya, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 12 (2016).
79.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15.
80.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Judges Grant the Prosecutor’s Request to
Launch an Investigation on Crimes Against Humanity with Regard to the Situation in Kenya
(Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=icc+judges+grant+the
+prosecutor%E2%80%99s+request+to+launch+an+investigation+on+crimes+a.
81.
Mueller, supra note 70, at 27.
82.
Kenyatta Case, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta (last visited Sept. 1, 2020); Uhuru Kenyatta, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/uhuru-kenyatta (last visited Sept 1, 2020).
83.
William Ruto and Joshua Sang, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/william-ruto-and-joshua-sang (last visited Sept. 1,
2020). The Court also summoned Henry Kogsey and Joshua Sang to appear alongside Ruto as
defendants in the first case, which dealt primarily with crimes against humanity committed
against Kikuyu supporters, and Francis Muthaura and Mohammed Hussein Ali to appear
alongside Kenyatta in the second case, which concerned the hiring of the Mungiki militia to
inflict retaliatory violence against non-Kikuyu supporters. Mueller, supra note 70, at 26.
84.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Case Information Sheet at 1,
(Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/KenyattaEng.pdf.
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transfer, and persecution for his alleged involvement in organizing and supporting a common plan to forcibly expel Kikuyu supporters and their allies
85
from the Rift valley.
Prior to Prosecutor Ocampo’s leveling of charges against Kenyatta and
Ruto, Kenya was largely supportive of the ICC. An Ipsos Kenya poll in October 2010 indicated that sixty-eight percent of Kenyans supported ICC in86
volvement in investigating and prosecuting the post-election violence. Indeed, both defendants were some of the Kenyan Parliament’s “strongest
supporters” in favor of the ICC handling the post-election violence cases in
2009 when they sought to avoid efforts to establish a domestic tribunal to
87
prosecute post-election violence. However, once the Prosecutor announced
charges, the popular view among Kenyans changed; fewer Kenyans continued to support ICC intervention and instead threw their support behind
88
Kenyatta and Ruto. This public support ultimately served as a vital tool in
the two defendants’ defense.

B. The Kenyan Propaganda Campaign
Despite hailing from opposite sides of the political aisle and even being
charged with committing crimes against humanity against each other’s po89
litical and ethnic groups, Kenyatta and Ruto found political gold littered
among their ICC charges. In April 2011, after returning from their first appearances before the ICC, Kenyatta and Ruto jointly conducted a prayer rally during which they attributed their charges to “politics and Western med90
dling.” Shortly thereafter, despite the pending ICC charges, the two rivals
decided to team up to create the Jubilee Coalition and run on the same ticket
91
for the forthcoming 2013 presidential election. Given the two men’s
unique predicament, they chose to utilize the ICC charges as the primary
focus of their campaign and joined forces over a common message of “ha-

85.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Case Information Sheet (Apr.
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/RutoSangEng.pdf.
86.
RORISANG LEKALAKE & STEPHEN BUCHANAN-CLARKE, AFROBAROMETER,
SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA 4 (2015),
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policy
paperno23_kenya_anti_corruption.pdf.
87.
Samuel M. Makinda, Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and Politicising the International
Criminal Court, CONVERSATION (May 30, 2013, 1:12 AM), https://theconversation.com
/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-and-politicising-the-international-criminal-court-14583.
88.
LEKALAKE & BUCHANAN-CLARKE, supra note 86, at 4 (noting support for ICC
intervention dropped from sixty-eight percent to fifty-seven percent following the announcement of the charges); see also Verini, supra note 67.
89.
Geoffrey Lugano, Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya, 11 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 9, 17 (2017).
90.
Dutton, supra note 6, at 110.
91.
Id.
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92

tred for the ICC.” Specifically, the men crafted a narrative labeling the
ICC as a “neocolonialist institution biased against Africa and improperly
intruding on Kenyan sovereignty” and painted themselves as “victims of
93
Western imperialism.” They further argued that the ICC targeted them exclusively for political reasons and approached the investigation with bias
94
and a lack of understanding. The campaign allowed for the opportunity to
drum up support from the Kenyan populace, and had the added benefit of
delegitimizing the charges against them—and the ICC itself—in the eyes of
the Kenyan population.
While Kenyatta and Ruto’s claims of African bias were widely accept95
ed, especially throughout Kenya, they were also filled with misrepresentations. As grounds for their arguments, Kenyatta and Ruto relied heavily on
the fact that as of 2013, the ICC had exclusively investigated, indicted, and
96
prosecuted African nationals. While this statement is accurate, it fails to
consider the context in which these investigations were opened. Most of the
African situations before the ICC had been self-referred, and as of 2013, the
ICC Prosecutor was also conducting preliminary investigations into situations in non-African countries, including Afghanistan, Honduras, and Ko97
rea. Of the eight African situations that were before the ICC in 2013, only
98
Kenya was the result of a propio motu investigation. Two others—Libya
and Sudan—were referred to the ICC by the Security Council. And, as
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda—a Gambian national—has noted, the remaining
five cases “were at the request of African states asking for the ICC’s inter99
vention.” So, while Kenyatta and Ruto’s highly publicized claims ap92.
Verini, supra note 67.
93.
Dutton, supra note 6, at 109, 110.
94.
Dancy et al., supra note 9, at 1447.
95.
LEKALAKE & BUCHANAN-CLARKE, supra note 86, at 8 (stating that, as of 2014,
thirty-five percent of Kenyans polled by Afrobarometer believed the ICC to be biased against
Kenyans and African states in general).
96.
See, e.g., Nanjala Nyabola, Does the ICC Have an Africa Problem?, GLOB. POL’Y
F. (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-internationalcriminal-court/general-documents-analysis-and-articles-on-the-icc/51456-does-the-icc-havean-africa-problem.html.
97.
See Int’l Crim. Ct., Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2013), ¶ 18
(Nov.
25,
2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/OTP%20Preliminary%20
Examinations/OTP%20-%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%
202013.PDF.
98.
Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Jan. 14, 2014, 3:22 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacks-internationalcriminal-court.
99.
Id.; Mark Caldwell, African Union Criticizes International Criminal Court at
Member States’ Meeting, DW (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.dw.com/en/african-unioncriticizes-international-criminal-court-at-member-states-meeting/a-18862799; see also Tim
Cocks, ICC Says Protecting Africans, Not Targeting Them, REUTERS (June 30, 2011, 1:20
AM), https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFJOE75T02A20110630 (quoting Prosecutor Bensouda’s explanation by explaining that the ICC’s focus on Africa has always been the result of the
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peared facially accurate, many scholars and ICC experts viewed them as
100
misrepresentative, or at best, overly simplistic.
As the Jubilee Coalition, Kenyatta and Ruto continued to utilize local
radio shows, nationally televised talk shows, and newspaper opinion articles
to spread their anti-ICC campaign message and accompanying disinfor101
mation. They also framed the 2013 presidential campaign around the critical issue of the ICC’s presence in Kenya, essentially turning the election
102
into a referendum on the ICC. The men’s propaganda war proved almost
immediately successful in drawing Kenyan support away from the ICC and
103
in their favor. Their labeling of the ICC as a neo-colonialist and antiAfrican entity resonated with the Kenyan populace, largely because of the
104
lack of public awareness and knowledge about the ICC in Africa. As a result, according to reporting by the International Justice Monitor, a poll conducted in June 2013 reflected Kenyan public support for the ICC at an alltime low, with only thirty-nine percent of respondents supporting the ICC
105
process. Kenyatta and Ruto were eventually able to distort the charges
against them to work in their favor, ultimately winning the Kenyan presi106
dential election, with Kenyatta officially becoming the first sitting head of
107
state to appear before the ICC.

African people’s engagement with the ICC, and that her investigations and prosecutions have
aimed to provide justice for the victims, all of whom have been African).
100.
See, e.g., Phil Clark, Why International Justice Must Go Local: the ICC in Africa,
AFR. RSCH. INST. (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite
/publications/why-international-justice-must-go-local-the-icc-in-africa/ (explaining that “criticism of the [ICC] on the grounds of anti-African bias or neo-colonialism is simplistic”); Dutton, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that “a great deal of evidence shows that the ICC functions
fairly and without clear institutional bias against Africa”); Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn & Barbora Hola, The Selection of Situations by the ICC: An Empirically Based
Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance, 15 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 38 (2015) (concluding
based on empirical evidence that criticism that the ICC is biased against African countries
“seems to be exaggerated”); see also, Nyabola, supra note 96 (noting that all of the ICC’s African situations involve “intractable crises that the international community has struggled to
resolve in a just and timely manner”).
101.
Lugano, supra note 89, at 11.
102.
Id. at 11.
103.
See Dutton, supra note 6, at 109 (recognizing that as a result of the propaganda,
“ordinary Kenyans supported those charged with crimes against humanity—instead of the
international institution trying to bring perpetrators to justice”).
104.
See id. at 109.
105.
Tom Maliti, Two Opinion Polls Show Support for the ICC Drops in Kenya, INT’L
JUST. MONITOR (July 13, 2013), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/07/two-opinion-polls-showsupport-for-the-icc-drops-in-kenya/ (relying on a poll conducted by Ipsos Synovate and also
noting that this reflected a drop of sixteen percentage points pertaining to support of the ICC
from a similar poll conducted in April 2012).
106.
See Did the ICC Help Uhuru Kenyatta Win Kenyan Election? BBC NEWS (Mar. 11,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21739347.
107.
Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute, supra note 78, at 27.
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Kenyatta and Ruto’s propaganda warfare did not end with the Jubilee’s
Coalition election victory, nor did it remain within the geographic confines
of Kenya. After the Kenyan Parliament moved to withdraw the country
108
from the Rome Statute—a result that never came to fruition —Kenyatta
109
and Ruto took their propaganda arguments to the African Union (“A.U.”).
The A.U. is a coalition of fifty-four African member nations, based loosely
110
on the European Union model, which aims to achieve greater unity and
solidarity between African countries and promote peace, stability, human
111
rights, and democratic values throughout Africa.
In October 2013, the A.U. held a special summit to discuss Africa’s re112
lationship with the ICC. During the summit, Kenyatta took the floor and
re-asserted his accusations that the ICC is anti-African and claimed that the
ICC was engaged in “race-hunting” as a “toy of declining imperial pow113
ers.” His statements helped galvanize the A.U. into taking the position
that sitting heads of state should be immune from arrest and prosecution before the ICC and to call on the U.N. Security Council to defer proceedings
114
against Kenyatta and Ruto. While the ICC and the Security Council declined to follow the A.U.’s recommendations, Kenyatta and Ruto’s propaganda left a lasting impression in Kenya and throughout A.U. countries that
ultimately grew into a full-scale revolution against the ICC.

C. A Lack of Cooperation
Kenyatta and Ruto supplemented their propaganda war against the ICC
with a strategy of non-compliance and obstruction to prevent the Prosecutor
from obtaining necessary evidence for trial. From the outset, the Prosecu-

108.
L. MUTHONI WANYEKI, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT’S
CASES
IN
KENYA:
ORIGIN
AND
IMPACT
13
(Apr.
2012),
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Paper237.pdf.
109.
See Katrina Manson, African Union to Vote on Kenyatta Trial, FIN. TIMES (May
25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/af9ac982-c556-11e2-af7a-00144feab7de (explaining
the origins of how Kenya’s feud with the ICC became a focal point of the African Union’s
2013 Assembly session); see also African Union Summit on ICC Pullout over Ruto Trial,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24173557 (quoting an
A.U. official noting that Kenya had been “criss-crossing Africa in search of support” for their
stance against the ICC).
110.
Profile: African Union, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news
/world-africa-16910745.
111.
About the African Union, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/overview (last visited Jan.
5, 2021); AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last visited Jan. 5,
2021).
112.
Solomon Ayele Dersso, The AU’s Extraordinary Summit Decisions on Africa-ICC
Relationship, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-aus-extraordinarysummit-decisions-on-africa-icc-relationship/.
113.
African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006.
114.
See Dersso, supra note 112.
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115

tor’s investigation was met with repeated refusals to cooperate. Despite
multiple requests for documents, including those pertaining to security
meetings held in Kenya during the post-election violence, cell phone records, and financial documents that could tie the defendants to allegations
that they financed the violence, the Kenyan Government—led by Kenyatta
116
and Ruto—refused to turn these over. The Government’s refusal to cooperate with the Prosecutor’s numerous formal requests for evidence ultimately led Prosecutor Bensouda to petition the Trial Chamber to find the Government of Kenya non-compliant in violation of article 87 of the Rome
117
Statute. The Trial Chamber ultimately found Kenya’s non-compliance to
fall “below the standard of good faith cooperation required from States Par118
ties,” yet declined to refer Kenya to the Assembly of States Parties as
permitted by the Rome Statute, deeming the Prosecution partially responsible for failing to quickly and repeatedly follow up on the Kenyan Govern119
ment’s refusal to turn over evidence.
In addition to this non-compliance, members of the Kenyan Government also engaged in underhanded tactics, instituting a level of witness in120
terference that Prosecutor Bensouda described as “unprecedented.” Ben115.
See Jennifer Stanley, From Nuremberg to Kenya: Compiling the Evidence for International Criminal Prosecutions, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 840 (2016).
116.
See, e.g., Michael Onyiego, Legal Challenges Threaten to Undermine ICC Investigation in Kenya, VOA NEWS (Oct. 3, 2010), https://www.voanews.com/africa/legalchallenges-threaten-undermine-icc-investigation-kenya (noting that the government would not
release reports from high-level security meetings); Dutton, supra note 78, at 28 (noting that
the government failed to turn over requested cell phone records that could have tied the defendants to organizing the violence); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution
Application for a Finding of Non-compliance, ¶¶ 6–21, (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_10100.PDF [hereinafter Prosecution Application for NonCompliance] (outlining the Prosecutor’s original request for financial and other records made
in April 2012 and a litany of follow-up attempts to secure the evidence, all of which proved
unsuccessful).
117.
Prosecutor Application for Non-Compliance, supra note 116, ¶¶ 1–2.
118.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Application
for Finding of Non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, ¶ 67, (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09899.PDF [hereinafter Trial Chamber’s Decision on Non-Compliance].
119.
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Non-Compliance, supra note 118, at ¶¶ 85–89; see
also Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Applications for a
Finding of Non-compliance Pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an Adjournment of the Provisional Trial Date, ¶ 52, (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2014_03112.PDF. The Trial Chamber originally declined to formally find Kenya in noncompliance and simply granted a six-month adjournment in response to the Prosecution’s initial request. Trial Chamber’s Decision on Non-Compliance, supra note 118, at ¶ 15. Following Kenya’s continued failure to cooperate, at a status conference in October 2014, Prosecutor
Bensouda orally maintained her initial application for a finding of noncompliance, prompting
the Trial Chamber to again address the pleading. Id.
120.
Natlie Ojewska, Uhuru Kenyatta’s Trial: A Case Study in What’s Wrong with the
ICC, GLOBALPOST (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-02-06/uhuru-kenyattastrial-case-study-whats-wrong-icc.
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souda’s investigation was thwarted by a widespread social media campaign
used to identify confidential witnesses as well as “concerted and wide121
ranging efforts to harass, intimidate, and threaten” potential witnesses.
Following the conclusion of the case against Ruto, Bensouda reported that
seventeen witnesses ultimately withdrew their cooperation as a result of
threats, public shaming, and intimidation from Kenyan politicians, commu122
nity leaders, and anonymous bloggers on social media. At the same time,
the Prosecutor’s investigation was undermined by a “steady and relentless
123
stream of false media reports about the Kenya cases.” The Kenyan media
would run stories supported by the defendants’ legal teams that foreign nations were seeking to intervene in the case proceedings in efforts to influ124
ence Kenya’s domestic politics. These unsubstantiated stories would report that foreign officials, including the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, and
Office of the Prosecutor personnel would recruit and bribe witnesses to tes125
tify against the defendants. Kenyatta and Ruto’s supporters supplemented
this more formal media coverage with social media campaigns aimed at discrediting the ICC and civil society groups, “pseudo blogs,” and “paid for
126
propaganda” designed to bolster support for the defendants.

D. Dismissal of Charges
In December 2013, after losing two key witnesses against Kenyatta—
one who was no longer willing to testify and one who confessed to giving
false evidence—Prosecutor Bensouda requested an adjournment of the trial
127
date to allow for additional investigation. The Trial Chamber granted the
121.
Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Status of the Government of Kenya’s Cooperation with the
Prosecution’s Investigations in the Kenyatta Case (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-04-12-2014 [hereinafter Prosecutor Statement on Status of
Kenya’s Cooperation].
122.
See Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding Trial Chamber’s Decision to Vacate Charges
Against Messrs William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang Without Prejudice to Their Prosecution in the Future (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat160406 [hereinafter Prosecutor Statement on Ruto Decision]; Catrina Stewart, ICC on Trial
Along with Kenya’s Elite Amid Claims of Bribery and Intimidation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/01/icc-trial-kenya-kenyatta-ruto (reporting that
at least a dozen witnesses who were scheduled to testify had been bribed or pressured to withdraw their testimonies).
123.
Prosecutor Statement on Status of Kenya’s Cooperation, supra note 121.
124.
See Sungi, supra note 62, at 154–55.
125.
Id. at 155.
126.
Archangel Byaruhanga Rukooko & Jon Silverman, The International Criminal
Court and Africa: A Fractious Relationship Assessed, 19 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 85, 92 (2019).
127.
Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Following an Application Seeking an Adjournment of the Provisional
Trial Date (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-1912-2013&ln=en; see also Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Notification of
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adjournment, and in October 2014, the Prosecutor requested a second, indefinite adjournment due to insufficient evidence resulting from Kenya’s
128
sustained lack of cooperation. Despite the Prosecutor’s claims that Kenya,
under Kenyatta’s direction, failed to comply with multiple requests for assistance issued by the ICC, the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s request for an indefinite adjournment and ordered the Prosecutor to file a notice either withdrawing charges or indicating that the evidence justified
129
proceeding to trial. In its decision, the Trial Chamber specifically noted
that the Prosecutor lacked any “concrete prospect of obtaining evidence suf130
ficient to meet the standard for trial and to sustain the current charges.” It
further placed the blame for the lack of evidence on the Prosecutor, reasoning that Prosecutor Bensouda should have made greater efforts to verify the
credibility and reliability of her evidence and “more vigorously pursued” the
131
issue of Kenya’s non-compliance at the early stages of the investigation.
The Prosecutor complied with the Trial Chamber’s decision by filing a
formal notice of her withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta on December 5,
132
133
2014, which was subsequently confirmed by the Trial Chamber. The
Trial Chamber’s decision specifically noted that the charges would be dismissed without prejudice, permitting the Prosecutor to refile in the future,
134
should she obtain sufficient evidence to support the charges. In publicly
justifying the withdrawal of charges, Prosecutor Bensouda clarified that her
decision was based purely on lack of evidence, largely stemming from wit135
ness tampering and Kenya’s lack of cooperation. Yet, there is little question that political pressures, specifically those exerted by Kenyatta’s propaganda campaign, influenced her decision. As scholar and blogger Mark

the Removal of a Witness from the Prosecution’s Witness List and Application for an Adjournment of the Provisional Trial Date, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.scribd.com
/document/192710288/Notification-of-the-removal-of-a-witness-from-the-Prosecution-switness-list-and-application-for-an-adjournment-of-the-provisional-trial-date.
128.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Further Adjournment, ¶ 17 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Further Adjournment].
129.
Id. at 26.
130.
Id. ¶ 49.
131.
Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
132.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of the
Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF.
133.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of
Charges Against Mr. Kenyatta, 6 (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2015_02842.PDF.
134.
Id. ¶ 9.
135.
Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Uhur Muigai Kenyatta
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
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Kersten points out, even if Bensouda’s decision was not grounded in politi136
cal considerations, it was publicly “perceived as political.”
The Prosecution fared similarly in the case against Deputy President
Ruto. Despite significant evidentiary issues, the case proceeded to trial in
137
September 2013. After 157 days of trial, the Prosecution closed its case in
138
September 2015. Subsequently, Ruto’s defense team filed for a judgment
139
of acquittal, and on April 5, 2016, the Trial Chamber, by a majority decision, vacated the charges against Ruto and discharged him from prosecu140
tion. Notably, the decision did not serve as an acquittal, as the defense requested, but simply dropped the charges without prejudice to future
141
prosecution. In separately authored opinions, the three majority judges
agreed that the Prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence for a rea142
sonable Trial Chamber to determine Ruto’s guilt. In his opinion, Judge
Eboe-Osuji spoke at length regarding the role of Kenya’s propaganda war in
143
the Trial Chamber’s decision. He recognized the “openly aggressive cam144
paign” leveled by Kenyan leaders, which included “witness interference at
a disturbing scale,” that was:
[B]olstered and accentuated by an atmosphere of intimidation, fostered by the withering hostility directed against these proceedings
by important voices that generate pressure within Kenya at the
community or national levels or both. Prominent among those were
voices from the executive and legislative branches of the Govern136.
Mark Kersten, What a Mess: ICC Prosecutor Seeks Delay in Kenyatta Trial, JUST.
CONFLICT (Dec. 19, 2013), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/12/19/what-a-mess-iccprosecutor-seeks-delay-in-kenyatta-trial/ (referring to Bensouda’s initial decision to request an
adjournment of the trial date).
137.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version of: Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 4 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF [hereinafter Ruto Decision on Judgments on Applications for Judgments of Acquittal]. Ruto’s case was tried jointly with the case against
Joshua Sang.
138.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Ruto and Sang Case: ICC Trial Chamber V(A) Terminates the Case Without Prejudice to Re-Prosecution in Future (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1205#:~:text=5%20April%202016-,Ruto
%20and%20Sang%20case%3A%20ICC%20Trial%20Chamber%20V(A),to%20re%2Dprosec
ution%20in%20future&text=According%20to%20the%20majority%2C%20this,may%20be
%20subject%20to%20appeal.
139.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version of “Corrigendum of Ruto Defence Request for Judgment of Acquittal” (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20293.PDF.
140.
Ruto Decision on Judgments on Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, supra
note 137, at 1.
141.
Id.
142.
Ruto Decision on Judgments on Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, supra
note 137.
143.
See id. ¶¶ 138–194.
144.
Id. ¶ 146.
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ment. It was plainly wrong for them to bring such voices to bear in
145
the course of an ongoing criminal trial.
Nevertheless, Judge Eboe-Osuji refused to allow the propaganda war to
result in an acquittal, as Kenyatta and Ruto had requested, noting that “an
146
acquittal in this case could never have resulted from political pressure.”
While he recognized that the leaders’ political campaign and affiliated conduct towards witnesses directly impeded the Prosecutor’s ability to present
her case, he made clear that “extra-judicial conducts, campaigns or demands
could not influence the Chamber to acquit or convict the accused” and that
nothing other than the evidence itself would influence the Chamber’s deci147
sion. Instead, Judge Eboe-Osuji specifically noted that the Prosecution retains the right to re-prosecute the case and reiterated that “political interven148
tion does not work.” Following the Trial Court’s decision, Prosecutor
Bensouda issued a statement in which she attributed the case’s demise to
erosion by a “‘perfect storm’ of witness interference and intense politiciza149
tion of the Court’s legal mandate and work.” Of the Trial Chamber’s decision to vacate charges against Ruto but not acquit him, Prosecutor Bensouda
said it sent the “strong message” that “witness interference and perverting
150
the cause of justice will not be tolerated at the ICC.”

E. Impact
Through tactile political maneuverings, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to
label the ICC as a tool of the imperial west intervening in the affairs of Af151
rican nations. Despite Prosecutor Bensouda’s optimistic takeaway from
the Trial Chamber decision and Judge Eboe-Osuji’s firm stance that the ICC
would not be swayed by political influence or propaganda, there is little
question that the Kenyan propaganda campaign successfully prompted the
Trial Chamber’s dismissal of charges against both Kenyatta and Ruto. By
swaying public opinion within Kenya and throughout the African Union,
Kenyatta and Ruto were able to justify a sustained campaign of noncooperation and non-compliance that ultimately led to their victory over the
ICC charges.
The immediate impact of the failed Kenya cases was devastating. Two
high-profile defendants, along with four other defendants charged within the
Situation in Kenya, for whom there existed a strong prima facie case of

145.
Id. ¶¶ 140–142.
146.
Id. ¶ 149.
147.
Id. ¶¶ 141–142, 145.
148.
Id. ¶¶ 149, 464.
149.
Prosecutor Statement on Ruto Decision, supra note 122.
150.
Id.
151.
See Michela Wrong, Argument: Has Kenya Destroyed the ICC?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(July 15, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/15/has-kenya-destroyed-the-icc/#.
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152

crimes against humanity, were able to defeat charges and escape without
serious consequence. In fact, Kenyatta and Ruto ultimately benefited from
the charges, as political science experts credited their propaganda campaign
153
against the ICC as a primary reason for their success in the 2013 election.
At the time of publication, Kenyatta and Ruto continue to serve in their re154
spective roles as President and Deputy President of Kenya, and to date,
155
the Prosecutor has not refiled charges against either defendant. The Prosecutor’s failure to prevail on charges against either defendant significantly
undermined the credibility and competency of not just the Office of the
156
Prosecutor, but the ICC more generally. Moreover, the defendants’ longrunning propaganda war succeeded in painting a lasting and vivid portrayal
of the ICC as a biased and racist institution.
Since there was a possibility that the Prosecutor could refile charges
against both men, Kenyatta and Ruto continued their propaganda war
157
against the ICC even after charges were dismissed. In early 2016, Kenyatta, who by then had earned the media’s title as the ICC’s “chief tormen158
tor,” made a speech to the A.U. in which he called for a “roadmap for
159
withdrawal” for African States Parties from the Rome Statute. Amidst

152.
See Alastair Leithead, Dismissal of Case Against Kenya’s Ruto Huge Blow to ICC,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35974172.
153.
See Courtney Hillebrecht, International Criminal Accountability and the Domestic
Politics of Resistance: Case Studies from Kenya and Lebanon, 54 L. & SOC’Y REV. 453, 477–
78 (2020) (arguing that Kenyatta and Ruto’s handling of the ICC charges contributed to their
electoral victory).
154.
Executive Office of the President, PRESIDENT KENYA, https://www.president.go.ke
/presidency/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021); Office of the Deputy President, PRESIDENT KENYA,
https://www.president.go.ke/office-of-the-deputy-president/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
155.
However, the Kenya Situation remains open before the ICC. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx (last visited Sept.
17, 2020).
156.
Simon Allison, Think Again: How to Beat the ICC – Lessons from the Kenyatta
Case, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/think-again-how-to-beat-theicc-lessons-from-the-kenyatta-case (last visited Sept. 17, 2020); see also Hillebrecht, supra
note 153, at 477.
157.
For instance, in October 2014, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, Kenya’s
ambassador to the UN reiterated the neo-colonialist narrative by arguing that the ICC is being
manipulated by “a pernicious group of countries,” who possess great power “mostly born of
an imperialist and colonial adventure.” Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute, supra note 78, at
25; Kenya’s United Nations Envoy Launches Stinging Attack on ICC, CITIZEN (Nov. 2, 2014),
https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/africa/Kenya-s-United-Nations-envoy-launches-stingingattack-on-ICC/3302426-2507942-7891xoz/index.html. Likewise, around the same time, Kenyatta publicly vowed never to never again cooperate with the ICC. Lugano, supra note 89, at
21.
158.
Ed Cropley, ICC’s Toughest Trial: Africa vs. ‘Infamous Caucasian Court’,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://br.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc/iccs-toughest-trial-africavs-infamous-caucasian-court-idUSKCN12S1U3.
159.
Id.; Batram S. Brown, The International Criminal Court in Africa: Impartiality,
Politics, Complementarity and Brexit, 31 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 145, 166 (2017).
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other controversies, such as the ICC’s indictment of then-Sudanese Presi160
dent Omar al-Bashir, the A.U. adopted Kenyatta’s proposal, and in 2017,
issued a non-binding resolution encouraging a withdrawal of African States
161
Parties from the Rome Statute. Although the proposed mass withdrawal
162
never materialized, it did prompt South Africa—albeit temporarily —and
163
Burundi to formally withdraw from the Rome Statute. Moreover this
large-scale threat of withdrawal presented such a critical legitimacy disaster
for the ICC that scholars began considering the “serious risk” that the ICC
164
could “fall apart entirely.”
The ICC has not fallen apart, but it does still live in the shadow of Kenya’s propaganda wars. While the ICC achieved significant achievements in
convicting several other defendants between 2016 and 2019, Prosecutor
Bensouda herself admits that these were overshadowed by the failures in
165
and aftermath of the Kenya cases. Moreover, the ICC still remains “a tox166
ic brand in much of Africa,” and allegations of anti-African bias continue
167
to plague the ICC.

160.
Priya Pillai, The African Union, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice: At the Fault Lines of International Accountability, AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L.: INSIGHTS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/10/africanunion-international-criminal-court-and-international-court (explaining the fraught A.U.-ICC
relationship is due in part to the ICC’s indictment of Al-Bashir and its repeated calls for his
arrest).
161.
Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document Afr. Union Ver. 12.01.2017 (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources
/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf; see also S.J. Tilden, Africa’s Conflict with the International Criminal Court: The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights as an
Alternative to the ICC, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 201 (2018).
162.
While South Africa initiated withdrawal proceedings, it ultimately revoked its decision to withdraw following a decision by a South African High Court that deemed the withdrawal “unconstitutional and invalid.” Hannah Woolaver, Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal: Lessons from South Africa’s Attempted Departure from the
International Criminal Court, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.: UNBOUND 450, 450–51 (2018).
163.
Burundi formally withdrew from the Rome Statute on October 27, 2017. Burundi,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). The Gambia
also indicated that it would withdraw, but it “reverse[d] course almost immediately after a
newly elected government assumed power.” Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the Threats of
Withdrawal, UN AFR. RENEWAL (May–July 2017), https://www.un.org/africarenewal
/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal.
164.
Galand, supra note 10, at 934.
165.
INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN 2019–2020, at 11
(July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726-strategic-plan-eng.pdf
[hereinafter [hereinafter ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN].
166.
Michela Wrong, supra note 151 (quoting John Ryle of the Rift Valley Institute
think tank).
167.
See Kamari Maxine Clarke, Negotiating Racial Injustice: How International Criminal Law Helps Entrench Structural Inequality, JUST SEC. (Jul. 24, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71614/negotiating-racial-injustice-how-international-criminallaw-helps-entrench-structural-inequality/ (alleging that the ICC’s “particular notion of justice

606

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:581

Possibly the most devastating legacy of the Kenya cases is that they
paved the way for future propaganda wars against the ICC. Kenyatta and
Ruto’s propaganda war and corresponding non-compliance created a
168
roadmap for states to use against future contested ICC charges. Kenyatta
and Ruto showed the world that the way to defeat the ICC was through a
combination of militarizing public opinion and obstructionism. A few years
after the charges against Kenyatta and Ruto were dismissed, the United
States leaders used this exact roadmap in efforts to avoid similar charges.

IV. The United States & The Investigation Into Afghanistan
Since its creation, one of the ICC’s greatest weaknesses has been the
lack of support from the world’s biggest superpower, the United States. Unlike Kenya, the United States is not and never has been a State Party to the
ICC. The ICC has long endured a turbulent relationship with the United
States, which has varied based on the presidential administration in pow169
er. However, even under George W. Bush, a president whose administra170
tion was stridently against the ICC’s mission, the United States never actively undermined ongoing ICC operations. This state of affairs changed
drastically under Former President Trump with Prosecutor Bensouda’s propio motu investigation into Afghanistan.

A. Request for Investigation & Subsequent Backlash
Since the 1970s, Afghanistan has endured a prolonged period of un171
rest. The country was torn apart by a series of civil wars, which ultimately
invited international participation and culminated in the U.S. invasion of

has caused it to reproduce deep, global structural inequalities” and specifically noting that of
the forty-two indictments issued by the ICC, all were for black or Arab-Africans).
168.
Allison, supra note 156 (“Thanks to Kenyatta, there is now a proven template for
evading international justice.”).
169.
See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Mark A. Drumbl, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: A Complicated, Uneasy, Yet at Times Engaging Relationship,
2–8
(Wash. U.
St. Louis
Legal Stud.
Rsch. Paper
Series, 2016),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1504&context=wlufac
(tracing the history of U.S. involvement in and relationship with the ICC under the Clinton,
Bush, and Obama administrations).
170.
See Milena Sterio, The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Prospect of Future Success, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 467, 473–74 (2020) (stating that “the
ICC had a difficult relationship with the United States during the George W. Bush administration).
171.
See Abdul Mahir Hazim, Toward Cooperation Between Afghanistan and the International Criminal Court, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615, 617 (2017) (noting that between
1978 and 2003, all parties to conflicts in Afghanistan have committed war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and human rights violations).
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172

Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist attacks. During this invasion, named “Operation Enduring Freedom,” American troops sought to
173
defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban-run Government. As part of the mission,
U.S. troops armed and trained Afghan anti-Taliban groups, which ultimately
174
succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power. Following the fall of the
Taliban, the security situation within the country remained dire, with dangerous levels of insurgency and the increased prevalence of terrorist groups
175
such as the Haqqani Network and ISIS.
During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military detained suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban members both within Afghanistan and at Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)-operated “black site” prisons in other na176
tions. As confirmed through Congressional reports, the CIA engaged in
177
government-approved torture of these detainees. The CIA “torture pro178
gram” provided for the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” against
captured suspected Taliban members by controversially labeling them as
“enemy combatants,” rather than prisoners of war, thereby depriving them
of many of the significant protections afforded by the Geneva Conven179
tions.
In 2006, under Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor opened a propio motu preliminary examination into alleged atrocity

172.
See Afghanistan, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org
/country/afghanistan (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
173.
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC_02/17, Public Redacted Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15”, 20
November 2017, ICC_02/17-7-Conf-Exp, ¶ 15, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2017_06891.PDF [hereinafter Request for Authorisation of Investigation].
174.
Id.
175.
Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶¶ 18–19.
176.
See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, De-Torturing the Logic: The Contribution of CAT
General Comment 2 to the Debate over Extraordinary Extradition, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 281,
281–82 (2008) (estimating that at least three dozen individuals have been held in secret prisons known as CIA “black sites”); see also Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra
note 173, ¶ 189 (alleging that U.S. armed forces committed crimes against at least twenty-four
detainees both in Afghanistan and in other States Parties, “namely Poland, Romania and Lithuania” between 2003 and 2004).
177.
See generally Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Dec. 9,
2014), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt
288.pdf; see also Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 193 (listing the
specific alleged acts used by CIA officials against detainees).
178.
Enhanced Interrogation Explained, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Feb. 2016),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Enhanced-Interrogation-Fact-Sheet.pdf
(detailing the practices that constituted “enhanced interrogation techniques” and their unlawfulness under international law).
179.
Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing “Enemy Combatants”and Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 5
(2007).
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180

crimes committed in Afghanistan. Minimal progress was made in the investigation until over a decade later, largely because of security concerns
and the Prosecutor’s inability to secure cooperation from stakeholders in the
181
investigation. However, in November 2017, as required to move forward
182
with a propio motu investigation pursuant to article 15, Prosecutor Fatou
Bensouda filed a formal request with Pre Trial Chamber III to open an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
in Afghanistan since May 1, 2003, as well as closely linked crimes commit183
ted in other States Parties’ territories since July 1, 2002. The scope of this
proposed investigation encompassed three general categories of alleged
crimes:
(1) Crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and
their affiliated Haqqani Network;
(2) War crimes by the Afghan National Security Forces … [;] and
(3) War crimes by members of U.S. armed forces on the territory
of Afghanistan, and by members of the U.S. CIA in secret detention facilities in Afghanistan and on the territory of other
States Parties to the Rome Statute, principally in the period of
184
2003-2004.
With regard to the third category of crimes encompassed in the proposed investigation, in her request, Bensouda acknowledged that the evidence acquired in her preliminary examination provided a reasonable basis
to find that U.S. armed forces engaged in war crimes of torture and cruel
treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and other forms of sex185
ual violence. In response to Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, the United
States went on the offensive, launching a disinformation and anti-ICC propaganda campaign before the media. This charge was largely led by National
Security Advisor John Bolton, until he was fired from the Trump Admin186
istration in 2019. Bolton is arguably the politician who boasts the most
strident anti-ICC history. As the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
under President George W. Bush, Bolton famously cited his “happiest mo-

180.
Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 22.
181.
Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 24.
182.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15.
183.
Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 187.
184.
Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages
/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh.
185.
Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 187.
186.
Peter Baker, Trump Ousts John Bolton as National Security Advisor, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/us/politics/john-bolton-nationalsecurity-adviser-trump.html.
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ment” as notifying the U.N. that the U.S. had symbolically “unsigned the
187
Rome Statute.”
On September 10, 2018, John Bolton used a speech to the Federalist
Society in Washington, D.C. to make a “major announcement” on U.S. pol188
icy towards the ICC. Bolton opened his address by chiding the ICC for
being “ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed outright dangerous,” and noting that while its theoretical aim is to hold atrocity perpetrators accountable,
189
in actuality, its central aim is to “constrain the United States.” He then
stated that the U.S. would “let the ICC die on its own,” since “for all intents
190
and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us.” Bolton closed his speech
with a “pledge to the American people,” that he would take specific actions
to respond to any future attempts to investigate the U.S., Israel, or its allies,
in which he threatened ICC personnel with sanctions and potential criminal
prosecution and warned any nations that chose to cooperate with the ICC
that their cooperation would detrimentally affect future U.S. foreign or mili191
tary assistance.
Bolton’s hyperbolic speech sent a clear message. Not only was this intended to bully the ICC and its Prosecutor into keeping their hands off
American sovereignty and American nationals, but this speech, given at a
high-profile event with press present, was meant to convey a louder global
message that America is more powerful than any international court. As
John Bellinger noted, rather than engaging the ICC in “quiet diplomacy,”
192
the Trump Administration chose to “[throw] down the gauntlet in public.”
And not only was Bolton’s speech hawkish and hyperbolic, but it also
served as a means of spreading disinformation. Most importantly, Bolton
repeatedly exaggerated the scope of ICC jurisdiction, boldly asserting without justification that the ICC seeks to apply universal jurisdiction and that it
would try to prosecute U.S. officials for the crime of aggression, which are,
193
in actuality, procedural impossibilities under the text of the Rome Statute.

187.
John B. Bellinger III, International Law and the Foreign Affairs Challenges for the
Next Administration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 909, 913 (2017); Letter from John R. Bolton, Under
Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen. (May 6,
2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
188.
Full Text of John Bolton’s Speech to the Federalist Society, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 10,
2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalistsociety-180910172828633.html [hereinafter Bolton Speech to Federalist Society].
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet to the ICC.
The Court Should Decline the Challenge, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2018, 11:50 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-throws-down-gauntlet-icc-court-shoulddecline-challenge; Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the
International Criminal Court, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2019).
193.
Alex Whiting, Why John Bolton vs. Int’l Criminal Court 2.0 is Different from Version 1.0, JUST SEC. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60680/international-

610

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:581

Some commentators questioned the validity of Bolton’s threats, with many
doubting the existence of any federal U.S. law that would allow for criminal
194
prosecution of court officials.
This speech was the first step in a prolonged anti-ICC publicity and disinformation campaign initiated by the Trump Administration. In his speech
to the U.N. General Assembly in late September 2018, President Trump referred to the ICC as “having no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authority” in the eyes of the United States, and echoed Bolton’s falsehoods that the
ICC “claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country,
195
violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process.” Then, on
April 5, 2019, following Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement
that he would impose visa restrictions on ICC personnel intending to travel
196
to the U.S. for the investigation, the United States revoked the entry visa
for Prosecutor Bensouda and threatened to take additional steps, including
197
imposing economic sanctions, if the ICC continued its investigation.

B. Pre-Trial Chamber Decision & Global Response
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval of Prosecutor Bensouda’s request for
an investigation was widely anticipated, and as one scholar noted, “a near
198
199
certainty.” Yet, in what many found to be a surprise decision, on April
12, 2019, the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a unanimous opinion
200
rejecting Prosecutor Bensouda’s request to proceed with the investigation.
Under Rome Statute article 15, if the ICC Prosecutor concludes that there is
criminal-court-john-bolton-afghanistan-torture/; David Bosco, Bolton Barked at the ICC, But
With How Much Bite?, LAWFARE (Sept. 11, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/bolton-barked-icc-how-much-bite.
194.
Bellinger, supra note 192 (noting that he is “not aware of any federal criminal statute that could be used to charge ICC judges or prosecutors”).
rd
195.
Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump to the 73 Session of
the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018), https://usoas.usmission.gov/remarksby-president-trump-to-the-73rd-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-yorkny/.
196.
Lesley Wroughton, U.S. Imposes Visa Bans on International Criminal Court Investigators - Pompeo, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-icc/u-simposes-bans-on-international-criminal-court-investigators-pompeo-idUSKCN1QW1ZH.
197.
Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing
Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world
/europe/us-icc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html.
198.
Bosco, supra note 193.
199.
Patryk I. Labuda, A Neo-Colonial Court for Weak States? Not Quite. Making Sense
of the International Criminal Court’s Afghanistan Decision, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 13, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-neo-colonial-court-for-weak-states-not-quite-making-sense-of-theinternational-criminal-courts-afghanistan-decision/.
200.
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Decision
Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ¶ 94 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF [hereinafter Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation].
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a “reasonable basis” to proceed with an investigation proprio motu, she
201
must request authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber. As the Pre-Trial
Chamber itself recognized, “reasonable basis” is the lowest evidentiary
202
standard in the ICC’s statutory framework. Article 53 provides the Prosecutor with additional insight into determining whether a “reasonable basis”
exists to open an investigation and outlines the following considerations:
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that
203
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
Article 15 further provides:
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and
the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commence204
ment of the investigation[.]
In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber recognized its “duty and responsibility to conduct a scrutiny on all of the evaluations that have led the Prosecutor to apply for an authorisation to investigate, including those pertinent
205
to the prospects of an investigation.” It then proceeded to review the Prosecutor’s evaluations of the three considerations in article 53: jurisdiction,
admissibility, and whether an investigation would not serve “the interests of
206
justice.” The Pre-Trial Chamber agreed that Prosecutor Bensouda’s proposed investigation met the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements of
the Rome Statute but ultimately determined that it would not further the in207
terests of justice. The Pre-Trial Chamber largely rested this determination
on its finding that the investigation had already met “severe constraints and
challenges” and that the “complexity and volatility of the political climate
still surrounding the Afghan scenario” made prospects of securing future
208
“meaningful cooperation from relevant authorities” unlikely.

201.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3).
202.
Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 31.
203.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 53(1).
204.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(4).
205.
Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 44.
206.
Id. ¶¶ 45–96
207.
Id. ¶ 87.
208.
Id. ¶¶ 44, 94. The Pre-Trial Chamber also recognized that interests of justice would
be undermined by the long delay between the crimes, which largely occurred between 2005
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While the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was warmly received by the
209
Trump Administration, it sparked new backlash from scholars, practition210
ers, and governments of States Parties. It portrayed the ICC as a weak institution willing to bend to political pressures exerted by superpowers. It also rewarded obstructionism and welcomed new attacks on the court,
recognizing that if states refused to cooperate with investigations, there
would be a greater likelihood that such investigations would fail to move
211
forward. In authoring an opinion viewed as controversial only among ICC
supporters, the Pre-Trial Chamber embroiled the ICC in a greater political
battle, essentially providing the ICC the ability to avoid being forced to rule
on controversial and highly political issues stemming from U.S. liability for
atrocity crimes. Scholar Jed Odermatt has recognized the proclivity of international courts that are predisposed to politics, such as the International
Court of Justice, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to dispose
of or decline to hear cases that would put the court in a sensitive position to
212
resolve a controversial political issue. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to reject Prosecutor Bensouda’s request for an investigation on procedural grounds, and specifically on the relatively low-profile “interests of
and 2015 and the investigation, as well as the significant amounts of resources the investigation would require. Id. ¶¶ 93, 95.
209.
Carol Morello, Trump Administration Applauds International Court’s Decision to
Abandon Afghan War Crimes Probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-applaudsinternational-courts-decision-to-abandon-afghan-war-crimes-probe/2019/04/12/610fd2b65d4a-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html (referencing a Presidential statement labeling the
decision “a major international victory, not only for [American] patriots, but for the rule of
law”).
210.
See, e.g., Afghanistan: ICC Refuses to Authorize Investigation, Caving into USA
Threats, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04
/afghanistan-icc-refuses-to-authorize-investigation-caving-into-usa-threats/ (opining that the
decision “marks a shocking abandonment of victims and will further weaken the court’s credibility”); Christian De Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big
Implications, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/noicc-investigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/ (noting that the decision “surprised and angered many”); Kevin Jon Heller, One Word for the PTC on the Interests
of Justice: Taliban, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 13, 2019) (recognizing that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision not only blocked an investigation into the United States, but also precluded investigations and prosecutions of Taliban officials responsible for heinous crimes, leaving their victims without justice); ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/12/icc-judges-reject-afghanistan-investigation.
211.
See ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, supra note 210; David Luban,
The “Interests of Justice” at the ICC: A Continuing Mystery, JUST SEC. (Mar. 17, 2020)
https://www.justsecurity.org/69188/the-interests-of-justice-at-the-icc-a-continuing-mystery/
(arguing that “it seems perverse to reward obstruction, and even more perverse to relabel defeat as ‘serving’ the interests of justice”).
212.
Jed Odermatt, Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International
Courts, 14 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT, 221, 227 (2018) (also recognizing that another strategy used
by international courts is to “decide a case, but to do so in a manner that avoids the most politically sensitive parts of the case”).
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justice” language, which many ICC experts believed plays little role in de213
termining whether to open investigations, exemplifies the political avoidance that Odermatt so deftly attributes to other international courts.
And while the Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion is notably absent of language referring to the United States’ propaganda campaign against the ICC,
the circumstances surrounding the decision strongly imply that the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s rejection was the product of U.S. pressures. For example, the
decision took seventeen months for the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue, which,
as critics have noted, was extensive for a relatively short and straightfor214
ward analysis. The decision was also issued on April 12, 2019, exactly a
215
week after Pompeo revoked the prosecutorial team’s travel visas. Even
more clearly, the Pre-Trial Chamber departed from its traditional approach
216
of removing all political considerations from its opinion, choosing instead
to openly acknowledge the “complexity and volatility of the political cli217
mate” surrounding the crimes under investigation.

C. Trial Chamber Decision & Resulting Sanctions
In the midst of the backlash to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, Prosecutor Bensouda and the legal representatives of eighty-two victims separate218
ly appealed the rejection of her request for authorization. On March 2020,
the Trial Chamber issued its judgment amending the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision and authorizing Bensouda to:
[C]ommence an investigation ‘in relation to alleged crimes
committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period since 1 May
2003, as well as other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed
conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation
and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the
219
period since 1 July 2002’.

213.
E.g. Labuda, supra note 199.
214.
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Rejects OTP Request to Open an Investigation in Afghanistan: Some Preliminary Thoughts on an Ultra Vires Decision, SPREADING JAM (Apr. 12,
2019), https://dovjacobs.com/2019/04/12/icc-pre-trial-chamber-rejects-otp-request-to-openan-investigation-in-afghanistan-some-preliminary-thoughts-on-an-ultra-vires-decision/.
215.
See id.
216.
ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, supra note 210 (noting the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s “decision to take political factors into consideration in its decision was unusual”).
217.
Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 94.
218.
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, Request for
Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” (June 7,
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03060.PDF; Situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA, Victims’ Appeal Brief (June 24, 2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03328.PDF.
219.
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA4, Judgment
on the appeal against the decision on the authorization of an investigation into the situation in
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The Appeals Chamber determined that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in
220
its interpretation of Rules 15 and 53. The Appeals Chamber specifically
found that while the Prosecutor must consider the article 53 considerations
in determining whether to request to open an investigation, the Pre-Trial
Chamber is only required to determine whether there is “a reasonable factual basis to proceed with an investigation, in the sense of whether crimes
have been committed and whether potential case(s) arising from such inves221
tigation appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.” The Pre-Trial
Chamber was not intended to second guess the Prosecutor’s analysis of the
article 53 considerations, and specifically should not even have analyzed
222
whether the proposed investigation furthered the “interests of justice.”
223
While ICC supporters welcomed the Trial Chamber’s decision, the
U.S. Government leveled a second wave of propaganda warfare against the
ICC. In a White House press conference on the day of the judgment, Secretary Pompeo discredited the ICC as an “unaccountable political institution
224
masquerading as a legal body.” Shortly thereafter, during a State Department press briefing, Secretary Pompeo singled out individual ICC personnel
and their family members, noting that the U.S. Government would consider
225
steps to take against them for “putting Americans at risk.” These vague,
226
highly publicized threats continued for months until the anticipated punthe Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, pmbl. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.PDF [hereinafter Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal].
220.
Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 23.
221.
Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 34.
222.
Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 37.
223.
See e.g., ICC Greenlights Afghanistan Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 5,
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/05/icc-greenlights-afghanistan-investigation (stating that the decision “gives atrocity victims hope for future justice); Afghanistan: ICC Authorizes Historic Investigation, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/latest/news/2020/03/afghanistan-icc-authorizes-historic-investigation/ (noting that through
this decision, the ICC “reversed a terrible mistake and decided to stand by the victims of war
crimes and crimes against humanity”); CICC Members: Welcome Afghanistan Decision Highlights Need to Protect the ICC, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 16, 2020)),
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cicc-members-welcome-Afghanistan-decision#:~:text=
CICC%20members%3A%20Welcome%20Afghanistan%20decision%20highlights%20need
%20to%20protect%20the%20ICC,-Share%20this%20page&text=On%205%20March%
202020%2C%20the,crimes%20against%20humanity%20in%20Afghanistan (listing Coalition
for the International Criminal Court representatives’ comments applauding the Trial Chamber’s decision).
224.
ICC Decision on Afghanistan, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Mar. 5, 2020), https://20172021.state.gov/icc-decision-on-afghanistan/index.html.
225.
Secretary Pompeo’s Remarks to the Press, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-6/index.html
(naming ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, Bensouda’s Chef de Cabinet Sam Shomanesh, and
Phakiso Mochochoko as individuals driving the investigation into American nationals).
226.
E.g. Quint Forgey, Pompeo Signals Impending Action Against ICC for Investigating Alleged U.S. War Crimes, POLITICO (June 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/06/01/mike-pompeo-icc-investigating-us-war-crimes-293673 (explaining how in early June,
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ishment came in the form of an Executive Order signed by President Trump
227
on June 11, 2020.
The Executive Order opened by explaining the danger the ICC’s Afghanistan investigation posed to the United States, noting that the Prosecutor’s actions “threaten to infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States
and impede the critical national security and foreign policy work of United
States Government and allied officials, and thereby threaten the national se228
curity and foreign policy work of the United States.” The order concluded
that this potential threat was sufficient to declare a “national emergency”
229
that warranted the imposition of sanctions. While the order did not actually level sanctions against specific individuals, it laid the legal groundwork
for imposing future sanctions against any foreign person determined by the
Secretary of State to have directly engaged or materially assisted in the
ICC’s investigation, arrest, detention, or prosecution of nationals of the U.S.
230
or its allies. These sanctions allowed the U.S. Government to freeze or
“block” any of the sanctioned person’s property or interests that are located
in the United States or which “come within the possession or control of any
231
United States person.” While it was unclear for several months whether
the United States would act on the Executive Order by issuing sanctions or
allow it to hang over the ICC as a threat, on September 2, 2020, Secretary
Pompeo formally announced the issuance of sanctions pursuant to the Executive Order against Prosecutor Bensouda and Phakiso Mocochoko, the
232
ICC’s Head of Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division.

D. Impact
Unlike with the propaganda war initiated by Kenya, the ICC is only just
beginning to feel the impact of the U.S. attack. The authorization and subsequent imposition of sanctions elicited strong criticism of U.S. conduct and
an outpouring of support for the ICC from scholars, civil society, and gov233
ernmental officials. Notably, in a joint statement, sixty-seven States Par-

Pompeo teased forthcoming governmental action to “push back” against the ICC in an interview on the conservative “What the Hell is Going On” podcast).
227.
Executive Order 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020).
228.
Id. at 36,139.
229.
Id. at 36,139.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 36,139.
232.
Actions to Protect U.S. Personnel from Illegitimate Investigation by the International Criminal Court, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Sept. 2, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/actionsto-protect-u-s-personnel-from-illegitimate-investigation-by-the-international-criminal-court
/index.html.
233.
See, e.g., Statement of Lawyer and Legal Scholars Against U.S. Sanctions on ICC
Investigators of Atrocities, STAN. L. SCH. (June 2020);https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/STATEMENT-OF-LAWYERS-AND-LEGAL-SCHOLARSAGAINST-U.S.-SANCTIONS-ON-ICC-INVESTIGATORS-OF-ATROCITIES-June-
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ties “reconfirm[ed their] unwavering support for the Court as an independent and impartial institution” and reiterated their commitment to defend the
234
ICC “against measures or threats” against it. Yet, it remains unclear what
practical impact this acknowledgment of support will have. When faced
with standing their ground on support for the ICC or being pressured by the
world’s greatest superpower, States Parties are placed between the figurative rock and hard place, and when put in similar predicaments in the past,
235
they have sided with the United States.
In January 2021, the United States experienced a shift to a presidential
administration led by President Joseph Biden. On April 1, 2021, President
Biden issued an Executive Order terminating the “national emergency” referenced in President Trump’s June 2020 Executive Order and lifting the
236
sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration on ICC personnel. However, in doing so, President Biden specifically noted the U.S. Government’s
sustained objections to the ICC’s “assertions of jurisdiction over personnel
of such non-States Parties as the United States and its allies absent their
237
consent or referral by the United Nations Security Council.” He further
maintained that the United States “will vigorously protect current and former United States personnel from any attempts to exercise such jurisdic238
tion.”
While the ICC may experience better relations with the United States
under the Biden Administration than it did under the Trump Administration,
it is highly unlikely that President Biden will return to the levels of coopera2020.pdf; Oppose Trump Administration Measures against the International Court, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (June 11, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/07/202007-07%20Oppose%20Trump%20Administration%20Measures%20against%20the%20
International%20Criminal%20Court.pdf (statement of a number of non-governmental and
civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA
against the United States’ sanctions); International Criminal Justice: Statement by the High
Representative Following the US Decision on Possible Sanctions Related to the International
Criminal Court, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. (June 16, 2020),
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80954/international-criminaljustice-statement-high-representative-following-us-decision-possible_en (statement by the
European Union High Representative reconfirming the European Union’s “unwavering support” for the ICC in light of U.S. sanctions).
234.
Statement in Support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Following the Release of the US Executive Order of 11 June 2020, PERMANENT MISSION FR. (June 23, 2020),
https://onu.delegfrance.org/We-remain-committed-to-an-international-rules-based-order.
235.
PARIS, supra note 53, at 70–74 (discussing the U.S. Government’s execution of
bilateral agreements with 102 nations in which both parties promised not to surrender each
other’s nationals to the ICC, many of which were negotiated by the United States under threat
of withdrawing foreign aid on which the other nations were dependent).
236.
Executive Order on the Termination of Emergency with Respect to the International
Criminal Court, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/presidential-actions/2021/04/01/executive-order-on-the-termination-of-emergency-withrespect-to-the-international-criminal-court/.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
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tion the ICC enjoyed under President Obama in 2008-2015—who publicly
ended American hostilities against the ICC and even voted in favor of a Security Council resolution that referred the Libya Situation to the ICC and
239
lobbied other Council members to do the same. At the time of publication,
the Prosecutor’s investigation into Afghanistan remains ongoing, and the
impact of this investigation on the U.S.-ICC relationship as well as the
ICC’s standing on the global stage remains to be seen.
Regardless of what the future holds, the United States, like Kenya, has
proven through its campaign of anti-ICC rhetoric and disinformation just
how susceptible the ICC is to political pressures and public opinion. Notably, the Trump Administration’s propaganda war has severely impacted the
ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Through the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling denying the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation, many were left believing that the ICC could be easily swayed by political pressures exerted by a
global superpower. Not only did this promote a perception of the ICC as a
weak entity, but it also reiterated a mentality that the ICC will “stay in its
lane” and continue to investigate and prosecute only those nations with a
weak pull on the geopolitical stage, while avoiding those who can easily solicit global public opinion. Despite the Trial Chamber’s accurate application
of the law, suspicions remain whether its ruling reversing the Pre-Trial
Chamber and permitting Bensouda’s investigation to proceed was—at least
partially—the result of pressures exerted by ICC supporters, including
States Parties, following the Pre-Trial Chamber’s denial. This change in position presents the ICC as disconnected and inconsistent and portrays it as
easily malleable to public opinion.
Despite the procedural inaccuracies plaguing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
Decision, the Trial Chamber’s approval of the investigation presents another
array of practical issues for the Prosecutor and the ICC. Proceeding with an
investigation into U.S. crimes, when the U.S. Government has adamantly
refused to provide any assistance and has indeed blocked the investigation
at every stage, appears to be setting the ICC up for failure. This is especially
true considering the success the obstructionist approach earned Kenyatta
and Ruto. A failed case against the United States holds the potential to further curtail the ICC’s power and permanently undermine its legitimacy and
240
authority. Unfortunately a decision to withdraw from the investigation at
this stage would validate the United States’ bully tactics. While a case
against U.S. officials would be a huge success for the ICC in terms of
achieving justice over impunity and fostering greater respect for the rule of
law, the cost of the case—in terms of undermining the ICC’s legitimacy—
could be overwhelming.

239.
Sara L. Ochs, The United States, The International Criminal Court, and the Situation in Afghanistan, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 89, 92 (2019).
240.
An investigation into the United States also makes future prospects for Security
Council referrals highly unlikely. Sterio, supra note 170, at 473.
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V. Limiting the Impact of Propaganda Warfare
When asked about his reaction to the U.S. Executive Order authorizing
sanctions against the court, ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji stated, “In any
system in which the rule of law is respected, courts are never coerced. They
241
may be criticized—even robustly. But never coerced.” However, the success of Kenya’s propaganda campaign against the ICC throws Judge EboeOsuji’s statement into question. Kenya and its supporters have shown that it
is possible, through prolonged and effective use of anti-ICC sentiment and
widespread propaganda, to force the ICC’s hand and to dictate its rulings in
certain cases. This weakness has translated into the ICC’s perceived bias,
which has fundamentally “damaged States Parties’ understandings of the
242
independence and fairness of the ICC.” The past success of propaganda
also paves the way for future attacks.
The reality is that the ICC is a court fundamentally subject to the will of
its States Parties, as well as to the pressures of powerful non-States Parties.
Moreover, because those states that carry political influence on the geopolitical stage are the most capable of militarizing widespread public opinion,
the ICC is often forced to cater to the most powerful nations, further exacer243
bating the political influence on the ICC.
While greater State Party membership—especially among superpowers—is a powerful enforcement mechanism, and a less reliant relationship
on the U.N. Security Council could significantly increase the ICC’s power
and ability to defend itself against propaganda wars, these changes are highly unlikely. Not only is the Rome Statute’s amendment process quite exten244
sive, but these new measures would require states—including those superpowers like the United States, China, and Russia—to surrender even
greater sovereignty. In the current political climate, such change is idealistic
at best. Another less palatable option is for the ICC to fully embrace its political nature, with the Prosecutor selecting to investigate only non245
controversial matters that would not anger powerful states. This approach
would allow the Prosecutor, and by extension, the ICC, to avoid contentious

241.
Tom O’Connor, ICC President Condemns ‘Unprecedented’ U.S. Attack on International Court, NEWSWEEK (June 22, 2020, 5:32 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/iccpresident-unprecedented-us-attack-court-1512541.
242.
True-Frost, supra note 43, at 263.
243.
ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 8(b).
244.
Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute’s Flawed Amendment Regime—Starvation in
NIAC Edition, OPINIO JURIS (July 12, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/07/the-romestatutes-flawed-amendment-regime-starvation-in-niac-edition/.
245.
See Allen S. Weiner, Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, International Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence, 12 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 545,
546 (2013) (making the “scandalous” argument that the ICC Prosecutor “needs to make careful and self-conscious political choices regarding charging strategies, particularly during the
formative stages of the tribunal, in order to enhance the effectiveness and international standing of the institution”).
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cases in hopes of pleasing the countries with the loudest voices while
drowning out those who lack the same international platform. And although
some strategic case selection by the Prosecutor is necessary, allowing selection to be guided primarily by political motivations runs contrary to the purpose of the Rome Statute. It would allow cases most deserving of prosecution to be met with impunity, simply because the perpetrators come from a
nation that holds significant geopolitical power. Impunity is not what was
envisioned during the creation of the ICC, nor what should be expected of
its future. In the long run, allowing politics to guide the ICC’s direction
would do more damage to the ICC’s legitimacy, and would contribute to an
image of the ICC as too weak to take on politically controversial cases.
The key to minimizing the detrimental impact of propaganda wars
against the ICC’s operations appears to lie in promoting the ICC’s perceived
legitimacy, both within States Parties as well as non-States Parties. In democratic nations, appealing directly to nationals could work to impose pressures on state governments to foster deeper relationships with the ICC.
Promoting the ICC’s perceived legitimacy will correlatively improve the
246
level of cooperation the ICC receives. Accordingly, it is imperative that
the ICC improve its perceived legitimacy first and foremost among its
States Parties. Doing so will promote cooperation in the event that a State
Party comes under investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, yet, even more importantly, it will solicit support among States Parties to pressure noncompliant states to cooperate with the ICC. The failure of States Parties to
respond to non-compliant states has contributed to many of the ICC’s failings, and as both Prosecutor Bensouda and ICC President Eboe-Osuji rec247
ognize, States Parties must act in the face of non-compliance. The need
for greater perceived legitimacy is also necessary among nationals of nonStates Parties. Increased legitimacy throughout non-States Parties could
both help in increasing ICC membership and in tempering non-State Party
propaganda warfare.
Obtaining greater success in prosecutions that publicly appear to be fair
and unbiased should be the primary focus in promoting the ICC’s legitimacy. Understandably, empirical research suggests that “people are most likely
to support the ICC when they believe international organizations are effec-

246.
True-Frost, supra note 43, at 315.
247.
Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Full Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on
External Expert Review and Lessons Drawn from the Kenya Situation, Annex 1, ICC OTP
Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Report of the External Independent Experts, at 5 (Nov. 26, 2019) (recognizing that one of the reasons for the
Prosecutor’s failure to effectively prosecute the Kenyan cases was that “States Parties [did
not] seem to have the political will to pressure the [Kenyan Government] to act consistent
with its obligations under the Statute and to refrain from allowing interference with and/or
interfering with the OTP criminal justice activities”); O’Connor, supra note 241 (reflecting
Judge Eboe-Osuji’s statement that an attack against the ICC is not only an attack against the
judicial mechanism itself, but on the 123 States Parties as well).
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248

tive and unbiased.” Both the Prosecutor and the Independent Expert Re249
view of the ICC solicited by the Assembly of States Parties have proposed
numerous strategies to achieve more effective investigations and prosecutions, including obtaining a stronger evidentiary base at an early stage in
250
every case; working more closely with national investigative and prosecutorial agencies and hiring more investigators, analysts and prosecutors from
diverse backgrounds, so as to be more equipped to navigate culturally diffi251
cult investigations; and implementing a more regular and effective review
252
of standards and practices. Significant changes in investigatory and prosecutorial strategy may also result with the upcoming transition in ICC prosecutorial leadership, with Karim Khan scheduled to replace Fatou Bensouda
253
as ICC Prosecutor and begin his nine-year term in June 2021.
To truly improve its perceived legitimacy, the ICC must also make a series of practical changes in its operations to complement these strategical
modifications, including both modifications to how the Prosecutor addresses
its relationships with nationals of States Parties and non-States Parties, as
well as how it handles issues of non-compliance during investigations. The
ICC must foster legitimacy through outreach and establish a presence on the
ground in post-conflict States when possible. It must also effectively cultivate a better public image by developing stronger public relations and
communications strategies. Finally, the ICC and the Assembly of States Parties must appropriately address issues of state non-compliance in order to
deter future obstructionist campaigns.

A. Fostering Legitimacy through Outreach & Presence
The ICC’s susceptibility to propaganda and the spread of disinformation, as evidenced in both the Kenya and Afghanistan Situations, can
largely be traced to a lack of knowledge about and unrealistic expectations

248.
Kelebogile Zvobgo, The Trump Administration opposes the International Criminal
Court. Do Americans Agree? WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2019, 1:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/28/trump-administration-opposesinternational-criminal-court-do-americans-agree/.
249.
Int’l Crim. Ct. Assembly of States Parties Res. ICC-ASP/18/Res. 7, ¶ 6, Review of
the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System (Dec. 6, 2019).
250.
ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 14(a). By frontloading the investigations, especially before any charges or summons are announced, the
Prosecutor faces less risk of State non-compliance that may arise after the announcement of
charges, as was the case in the Kenya Situation.
251.
Id. ¶ 16.
252.
Id. ¶ 17; see Independent Expert Review of the international Criminal Court and the
Rome Statute System Final Report, ICC-ASP/18/Res.7, at 117–18; 258–59 (Sept. 30, 2020)
[hereinafter ICC Expert Review].
253.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Assembly of States Parties concludes the second resumption of its nineteenth session (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages
/item.aspx?name=pr1567.
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of the ICC by nationals of States Parties and non-States Parties alike. As
the current ICC Office of the Prosecutor has lamented, “affected communities and members of the public often expect the Office [of the Prosecutor] to
exercise jurisdiction in the most serious situations of conflict and criminality
255
around the world, including situations where the ICC has no jurisdiction.”
Unrealistic expectations of the ICC are unfortunately all too common given
the lack of widespread global understanding of the ICC’s complexities, such
as its jurisdictional reach or its principle of complementarity.
Kenya demonstrated just how serious of a concern a lack of national
knowledge about the ICC can be. As Yvonne Dutton has explained,
Poor communication led victims to have unrealistic expectations
about what the ICC could achieve in Kenya—resulting in victims
becoming dissatisfied with the Court’s progress. It comes as no
surprise that the public did not mobilize on behalf of the ICC when
the public in “some parts of Kenya that bore the brunt of the vio256
lence” was “barely aware” of the Court.
This lack of knowledge led to Kenyans being easily swayed by their political leaders’ misrepresentations about the ICC. The same problem—lack
of knowledge and familiarity with the ICC—is evident in the United States.
This problem is most aptly summarized by Richard Dicker of Human Rights
Watch who has said:
Americans don’t really pay much attention to these sorts of foreign
policy things, which is why the media don’t bother investigating or
explaining… This is sad because I believe that if we were successful in getting information out to people, they would see that there is
no contradiction between their deeply held values and what the In257
ternational Criminal Court stands for.
Dicker’s statement has epistemological support. A 2018 study conducted by Ipsos identified that seventy-three percent of the 1,004 adult Americans polled supported “international organizations that ‘support human
258
rights and hold individuals accountable for mass atrocities.’” Yet, only
forty-five percent of the Americans polled were aware of the existence of
259
the ICC. Of those who admitted awareness, relatively few had a basic
knowledge of the ICC, with sixty-two percent incorrectly believing that the
254.
The Real Story, Podcast: Has the International Criminal Court Failed?, BBC:
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csydcn.
255.
ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 8(a).
256.
Dutton, supra note 6, at 106.
257.
PARIS, supra note 53, at 67.
258.
Study of Americans who Know about the ICC – Number of Americans Who Support
the ICC Grows, IPSOS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news
/documents/2018-04/american_bar_association-factum-2018_04_11.pdf
259.
Id.
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260

United States is a State Party. Given this general lack of knowledge, studies have reflected that Americans are heavily reliant on publicly made arguments, including those from partisan political leaders, to form their opin261
ions regarding the ICC, making the Trump Administration’s propaganda
war that much more damaging. While anti-ICC rhetoric dominates the media, the voices of ICC supporters are less publicized. Outside of the occasional editorial opinion or tweet by a high-profile politician with a sizable
262
following, much of the opposition to Trump’s propaganda war can be
found on scholarly blogs or on other outlets primarily targeting audiences
who are already knowledgeable about the ICC. As a result, much of what
the American public at large has heard about the ICC is the Trump Administration’s unsupported and biased claims and its retaliatory response to the
ICC’s lawful investigation.
Since knowledge and understanding of the ICC is fundamental to the
ICC’s legitimacy, and, by extension, states’ willingness to cooperate with
investigations, critical resources need to be devoted to ICC outreach. The
ICC’s External Expert Review identifies outreach efforts as opportunities
for the ICC to “win the confidence, support, and cooperation of people and
communities that have often been traumatised and scarred by the events the
263
ICC is investigating.” The ICC has fallen flat in outreach especially in recent years. In its nascent years, the ICC adopted a “low-profile approach” to
outreach, conducting outreach missions on an ad hoc basis by staff perma264
nently based in the Hague. This approach presented a perception that the
ICC was disengaged from the people directly impacted by the cases which it
265
investigated. While the ICC’s outreach improved for several years, espe266
cially once a dedicated Outreach Unit was finally established in 2007, outreach no longer seems to be one of the ICC’s primary objectives. Instead,
recent outreach efforts have been informationally and culturally insufficient
for recipients to understand and appreciate the ICC’s role in a particular sit-

260.
Id. Other researchers encountered a similar problem. In a 2019 study of 1,020
online participants, about half had no prior knowledge of the ICC, and even those with
knowledge were not deeply familiar. Zvobgo, supra note 248.
261.
Zvobgo, supra note 248.
262.
See Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:42 PM),
https://twitter.com/SenSanders/status/1301244152634585091 (in which Senator and 2020
Presidential Candidate Bernie Sanders tweeted “Sanctioning the [ICC] shows once again that
Trump is on the side of authoritarians around the world. The United States should be working
to strengthen international human rights standards, not targeting officials who uphold them.”).
263.
ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 125–26.
264.
Sara Darehshori, Lessons for Outreach from the Ad Hoc Tribunals, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 299, 303 (2008).
265.
Id.
266.
The ICC also improved on its outreach initiatives in the third situation to open before the Court, in which the ICC opened a field office in the Central African Republic within
five months of commencing criminal investigations. Id. at 303, 306.
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267

uation. While the ICC publicized and evaluated its outreach efforts in annual reports from 2007 to 2010, its most recent report is more than a decade
268
old. Moreover, outreach initiatives were not addressed in the 2019-2021
269
Strategic Plans issued by the Office of the Prosecutor or the ICC’s Regis270
try, the organ of the ICC responsible for conducting outreach, and demands for the ICC to rejuvenate its outreach program have gone largely un271
addressed.
To cure its current perceived legitimacy crisis, caused by repeated
propaganda wars, the ICC must revitalize its outreach program. Specifically,
the ICC needs to approach the concept of outreach with the goal of educat272
ing the global populace at large about the ICC and its operations. Outreach should largely be based around the idea “that when stakeholders understand the issues and are engaged in a justice institution’s work, support
273
will likely follow.” Accordingly, opportunities should also be given for
the populace to question the ICC and express their expectations and criti274
cisms. Permitting civilian feedback and incorporating this feedback into
future strategic plans will help bring local involvement into the ICC and will
mold a court more responsive to the public’s expectations, thereby directly
improving the ICC’s perceived legitimacy.
For States Parties under prosecutorial investigation, it is especially important that the ICC use outreach to connect with the local communities and
foster support of the ICC’s initiatives in that state. Doing so will inspire
greater governmental cooperation and will more easily combat potential
propaganda utilized by the defendants subject to ICC investigation. Outreach should be instituted early in the case process, throughout the prelimi275
nary examination stage. In considering how best to connect with the pub-

267.
ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 126 (also recognizing that outreach efforts
have encountered “significant delays”).
268.
Interacting with Communities Affected by Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/interacting-with-communities (last visited Sept. 10, 2020)
(providing Outreach Reports only for 2007-2010).
269.
ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165.
270.
Registry Strategic Plan (2019-2021), ¶ 3 (July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/itemsDocuments/190717-reg-strategic-plan-eng.pdf.
271.
See generally, e.g., Dutton, supra note 6 (recommending that the ICC engage in
greater in-person outreach); NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT’S FIELD PRESENCE (2009), http://www.npwj.org/sites/default/files/documents/File
/Field%20Operations%20Paper%20November%202009.pdf (calling for the States Parties and
organs of the ICC to consider using ICC field offices to improve state-Court relations).
272.
Alison Smith, Outreach and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers: A Civil Society Practitioner’s Perspective, 20 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 125, 130 (2020).
273.
Id.
274.
See id. (noting that effective court outreach will be “bi-directional”).
275.
Id. at 132–33; see also Darehshori, supra note 264, at 303–04 (noting that had it not
failed to institute early outreach in Uganda, the ICC could have mitigated a negative perception widely held by the Ugandan public).
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lic in States Parties, the ICC should consider the outreach successes
276
achieved by several hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra
277
278
Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
both of which were located in-state. The Sierra Leonean Court, for instance,
developed a beneficial relationship with the local media that facilitated ac279
cessibility of its proceedings to the general population in Sierra Leone.
The Cambodian Tribunal likewise engaged in significant and effective outreach throughout Cambodia by facilitating the visits of hundreds of thou280
sands of Cambodians to the tribunal to attend court proceedings.
Arguably, the best way to promote a better view of the ICC among the
communities it is designed to serve is to develop an on-the-ground presence,
as was effectively done in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. As a permanent international court, the ICC is primarily seated in the Hague, far removed
281
from nearly all of the situations it investigates. This lack of presence is
incredibly damaging to the ICC in terms of legitimacy because it creates a
perception of far-removed justice. Legitimacy and location are inextricably
intertwined; in the minds of victims and members of post-conflict societies,
282
“geographic distance equates to institutional indifference.” Communities
cannot enjoy a sense of local ownership over or connection to the justice
process when this is occurring worlds away from where they are located,
especially when the trials are not widely publicized in the post-conflict
283
state. The ICC, however, has a means of fostering this local ownership.

276.
Hybrid tribunals blend characteristics of domestic and international courts by typically sitting in the state where the crimes at issue were committed; staffing international and
domestic judges, lawyers, and staff; and applying a mix of international and domestic law and
procedures. Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 169, 172–73 (2016).
277.
Dutton, supra note 6, at 92 (recognizing the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the
“gold standard of tribunal outreach initiatives”).
278.
JOHN D. CIORCIARI & ANNE HEINDEL, HYBRID JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 271 (2014) (noting that as of 2014, the Cambodian
Tribunal had surpassed all other international courts in terms of outreach).
279.
See Patrick Vinck & Phuong N. Pham, Outreach Evaluation: The International
Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, 4 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 421, 423 (2010).
280.
CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 278, at 240–41.
281.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 3(1); Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host State, ICC-BD/04-01-08 (Mar. 1, 2008),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/99A82721-ED93-4088-B84D-7B8ADA4DD062
/280775/ICCBD040108ENG1.pdf.
282.
Frank Dame, The Effect of International Criminal Tribunals on Local Judicial Culture: The Superiority of the Hybrid Tribunal, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 211, 246 (2015).
283.
Id.; see also David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2007)
(noting that victims can easily dismiss the processes of far removed international courts as
being “imposed by foreign countries and organizations who have misunderstood what really
happened”); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 736 (2003) (recognizing that
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Under Rome Statute article 3, the ICC, in its discretion, may sit in a location
284
outside of the Hague, “whenever it considers it desirable.” Yet, despite
285
repeated calls for the ICC to sit locally, some of which it has openly con286
sidered, to date, the ICC has yet to conduct any trials outside of the
Hague.
Temporarily re-locating the ICC locally would bring “a psychological
proximity and sense of connection with the local community,” that would
287
directly enhance the ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Rather than being perceived as a foreign court imposing justice without any direct stake in the
community, the ICC could better portray itself as an institution designed to
provide transitional and restorative justice to post-conflict communities.
This change in venue would also provide for greater in-person outreach
measures and improve the public’s knowledge of the ICC’s workings.
Moreover, conducting ICC proceedings locally would foster significant
transitional justice benefits that are currently lacking in the ICC. As a local
court, the ICC could engage directly in capacity building measures to train
288
local judges and prosecutors. These benefits are evident in the work of
289
various hybrid tribunals located in post-conflict states. Many of these tribunals, including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
the hybrid tribunal created to prosecute atrocities committed in Cambodia
during the 1970s Khmer Rouge regime have engaged in outreach efforts
that have far surpassed the ICC and the ad hoc international criminal tribu290
nals. In fact, given in its location in Cambodia, the Cambodian tribunal
has succeeded in facilitating the visits of significant number of Khmer
291
Rouge victims or victims’ relatives to the tribunal to attend court hearings.
By sitting locally and adopting the hybrid tribunals’ approach to outreach,

“when a tribunal is perceived as a foreign agent, imposing its will on a national system, it
quickly loses credibility”).
284.
Rome Statute, supra note 55, art. 3(3).
285.
Angelique Lu, Bangladesh’s Rohingya Refugees Lobby ICC to Sit in Asia During
War Crimes Investigation, ABC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.abc.net.au/news/202009-01/bangladesh-rohingya-international-criminal-court-asia-refugees/12571818
(reporting
recent calls by lawyers representing Rohingya victims for the ICC to sit in Asia to resolve
cases within the Situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar).
286.
Stuart Ford, The International Criminal Court and Proximity to the Scene of the
Crime: Does the Rome Statute Permit all of the ICC’s Trials to Take Place at Local or Regional Chambers? 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 716 (2010) (recognizing that the ICC agreed
to consider Tanzania’s offer to host ICC trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda’s facilities in Arusha, Tanzania, yet never took action on this proposal).
287.
Burke-White, supra note 283, at 736.
288.
Id. at 735–36.
289.
Sara L. Ochs, A Renewed Call for Hybrid Tribunals, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.,
351, 397–99 (2020) (discussing the restorative and transitional justice provided by in-state
hybrid tribunals in the form of local ownership).
290.
Id. at 387 (citing CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 278, at 271).
291.
Id.
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the ICC can bring practical change to the domestic legal systems of the
post-conflict states where it conducts investigations and can thus can generate a legacy of legitimacy within the state and greater region that will remain beyond its stay.
Of course, sitting locally would not be practical for all or even most
cases, and would only be possible in states with a certain level of stability
292
and where the state’s government supports the ICC’s investigation. Thus,
in circumstances where a state seeks to use a propaganda war against the
ICC—like in Kenya or the United States—security concerns and potential
political interference in ICC operations would outweigh any transitional justice or outreach benefit. Yet, by sitting locally when possible, the ICC can
cultivate greater legitimacy and knowledge and directly improve the public’s perception of its legitimacy.
Attention must also be given to outreach in States Parties not subject to
investigation, as well as in non-States Parties. As the ICC’s Independent
Expert Report notes, the ICC needs to further promote outreach by enhanc293
ing coordination with civil society organizations. For instance, initiatives
like the Coalition for the ICC and the American Bar Association’s ICC Project in the United States have made great strides in explaining and highlight294
ing the ICC to the general population. However, their collective reach remains constrained by ineffective communication with the Office of the
295
Prosecutor. By investing greater time and resources directly into direct
outreach measures and greater collaboration with civil society organizations
in both States Parties and non-States Parties, the ICC can foster knowledge
of, involvement in, and connection to the ICC that is currently lacking, and
in doing so, inspire greater state cooperation in future investigations.

B. Enhancing Public Image
In addition to fostering knowledge of the ICC through expanded outreach and presence, one of the most straightforward and practical measures
the ICC can adopt to promote its legitimacy is a better approach to public
relations. As a result of the ICC’s lack of an integrated or comprehensive
296
communications strategy, it is currently suffering from a number of public
relations challenges and has recently been plagued by a dysfunctional, elitist
image. Notably, experts have noted a “breakdown in collegiality” between
292.
Ford, supra note 286, at 718.
293.
ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 123.
294.
See generally What We Do, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/about/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (outlining the
work of the Coalition for the ICC); American Bar Association’s International Criminal Court
Project, ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://www.aba-icc.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (explaining
that this project aims to support the ICC and US-ICC relations “through advocacy, education,
and practical legal assistance”).
295.
ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 122.
296.
Id. at 124.
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the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC judges as well as among the judges
297
themselves. Even worse, a publicized internal battle between ICC administration and judges demanding higher salaries is contributing to a widely
held perception of the ICC as “an elite institution whose members are out of
298
tune with reality.” Moreover, while the ICC’s failings and negative attributes are often widely reported, their achievements are much less so. As Stuart Ford concluded after synthesizing a number of recent empirical studies,
the ICC has succeeded in preventing violence and successfully reducing the
299
global number of serious human rights abuses. Yet, conclusions such as
Professor Ford’s are often drowned out by the criticisms of the ICC’s more
tangible failures, such as the dismissal of charges against Ruto and Kenyatta.
Recent events further indicate the ICC’s need for greater publicity of its
achievements. For instance, in early September, several esteemed news out300
lets, including the New York Times, reported that two soldiers of the Myanmar Army had confessed on video to committing crimes against Rohing301
ya Muslims pursuant to genocidal orders. The New York Times further rereported that the men had been transferred to ICC custody on September 7,
302
2020, for further detention and questioning. Given that the Prosecutor has
opened a propio motu investigation into crimes against the Rohingya com303
mitted in Myanmar, acquiring custody over two soldiers willing to testify
as to genocidal intent would be considered a great victory for the ICC Prosecutor. Yet, without explanation, the ICC and the Prosecutor have remained
silent, refusing to confirm or deny custody of the two men. Not only does
this fail to publicize a worthy prosecutorial accomplishment in a highprofile case, but in the event that the men are not actually in custody—
297.
Sterio, supra note 170, at 471; Douglas Guilfoyle, Part II-This is not fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/.
298.
Sterio, supra note 170, at 473.
299.
Stuart Ford, Can the International Criminal Court Succeed? An Analysis of the
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20 (2020).
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Reports, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya
/two-myanmar-soldiers-taken-to-the-hague-after-confessing-to-rohingya-killings-reportsidUSKBN25Z1KD (noting that the news had been reported by the New York Times, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the human rights group Fortify Rights).
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Slaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020) (explaining that in video testimony, the men confessed
that they obeyed orders from their commanding officers to “kill all you see, whether children
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to Mass Atrocities, CBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/myanmarsoldiers-custody-hague-1.5715272.
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which has been lightly debated —then the ICC’s failure to formally dispute the reporting contributes to a lack of transparency that clouds general
knowledge of the ICC’s work. Either way, a strong public relations approach and straightforward, court-wide communications strategy would
have handled this situation much differently.
And while public relations do not fall directly within the ICC’s mandate, it is a necessary evil that the ICC must consider in seeking to boost its
perceived legitimacy. This is especially necessary considering that some of
the exact individuals whom the Prosecutor is targeting use public relations
firms to boost their own global image and to further their propaganda wars
305
against the ICC. As an example, Kenyatta hired the British public relations firm BTP Advisers to assist in his 2013 election campaign, which
“used their local and international networks to present the ICC as a machi306
nation of Western powers.” While Kenyatta and Ruto are assumed to be
responsible for painting the ICC as a neo-colonialist institution, ironically,
the blame for this is likely better attributed to white British spin-doctors. By
not taking full advantage of public relations and effective communications
opportunities, the ICC is placing itself at an even greater disadvantage to
powerful nations. Idealistically a court should never have to rely on publicity; however, for a court like the ICC, which is fully dependent on support
and legitimacy, failing to utilize public relations will further hamper its ability to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions.

C. Stronger Consequences for Noncompliance
Propaganda warfare is so devastating because it is often supplemented—as done by Kenya and threatened by the United States—by a refusal to
cooperate with ICC investigations or prosecutions. As discussed at length,
the ICC can only function effectively when its States Parties cooperate with
307
the ICC. And while increased outreach and better public relations can inspire greater cooperation, the Rome Statute’s current compliance scheme
308
provides no definitive punitive recourse against non-compliant States. Ar304.
Two Myanmar Soldiers Taken to the Hague, supra note 300 (reporting that an ICC
spokesperson denied that the ICC had the men in custody).
305.
See generally CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY, SPIN DOCTORS TO THE AUTOCRATS:
HOW EUROPEAN PR FIRMS WHITEWASH REPRESSIVE REGIMES (2015) available at
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/20150120_spindoctors_mr.pdf (explaining that
many autocratic regimes, including those currently subject to investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel, use European
public relations firms to improve their global image).
306.
Id. at 34.
307.
Ali, supra note 38, at 415 (arguing that without enforcement mechanisms to ensure
compliance, “the ICC will be extremely ineffective in its mandate to administer justice”).
308.
Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years Later: Appraisal
and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 246–47 (2013) (noting that after ten
years, Article 87 “has not been able to force state parties to comply with their duty to cooperate”).
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ticle 87 provides for the referral of non-compliant States Parties to the Assembly of States Parties or—in the event that the non-compliance relates to
a Security Council-referred Situation—to the Security Council, but it fails to
delineate what actions either the Assembly of States Parties or the Security
309
Council may take upon referral.
Kenya’s largely unpunished non-compliance drew glaring light on the
Rome Statute’s enforcement deficiencies. Despite the Trial Chamber’s initial refusal to formally find Kenya non-compliant, in response to the Prose310
cution’s appeal, the Trial Chamber issued a decision in 2016—following
the termination of charges against both Kenyatta and Ruto—declaring the
Kenyan Government non-compliant under article 87 and referring it to the
311
Assembly of States Parties. However, Kenya does not appear to have
faced any real consequence from the Assembly of States Parties following
its referral. Instead, the 2016 Assembly of States Parties Report of the Bureau on non-Cooperation simply made a note of the Trial Chamber’s finding
of non-compliance but failed to acknowledge any punitive action taken
312
against Kenya in response to the finding. As a result, not only did the
Kenyan defendants escape liability for alleged crimes against humanity, but
they further avoided any consequence for their stark violations of the Rome
313
Statute.
To guarantee more committed cooperation by States Parties, the ICC
needs to encourage modifications to its compliance scheme. However, rather than amending the Rome Statute, it should call upon the Assembly of
States Parties, which is composed of representatives of States Parties to the
Rome Statute and acts as the ICC’s “management oversight and legislative

309.
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310.
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311.
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ICC-01/09-02/11 (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_
06654.PDF.
312.
See generally Assembly of States Parties Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation,
ICC-ASP/15/131 (Nov. 8, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP15-31-ENG.pdf (acknowledging the Trial Chamber’s finding of Kenya’s noncompliance but
taking no punitive action in response).
313.
While certain media outlets have reported that the Prosecutor has initiated a witness
tampering investigation into the Kenyatta and Ruto cases, to date, no formal proceedings have
resulted from this alleged investigation. Kamore Maina, Kenya-ICC starts investigation into
witness tampering in Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang cases, AFR. SUSTAINABLE CONSERVATION
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body,” to utilize stronger tools to rectify non-compliance. Article 87 already impliedly provides for the Assembly of States Parties to handle refer315
rals of non-compliance in the means it deems fit, and article 112 reinforces this by granting the Assembly the right to consider “any question relating
316
to non-cooperation.” Despite these broad delegations of power, and as evidenced with the referral of Kenya, the Assembly of States Parties has taken
a very minimal response to dealing with referred non-compliant States Parties in the past. While the Assembly has issued several annual resolutions
pertaining to the issue of state cooperation with the ICC, these appear to do
no more than simply restate the Rome Statute’s mandatory cooperation
scheme and call upon states to voluntarily consider strengthening their co317
operative relationships with the ICC. This approach is insufficient. As evidenced through past propaganda wars, States Parties will not voluntarily
cooperate with the ICC unless doing so would promote their national self318
interests. Instead, States Parties will only be prompted to cooperate under
319
threat of punitive consequences.
Accordingly, the Assembly of States Parties should consider enacting a
Resolution encouraging States Parties to impose bilateral economic or diplomatic sanctions on States Parties whom the Trial Chamber has deemed
non-compliant. Monetary penalties have previously proven effective in enforcing compliance with ICC orders. As Annie Wartanian has noted, the
United States was able to ensure Serbian compliance with orders issued by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by condition320
ing foreign aid to the Former Yugoslavia on this compliance. By inspiring
States Parties to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions, States Parties
subject to ICC investigation would be much more willing to comply, upon
being pressured to choose between financial consequences or liability.
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Moreover, encouraging States Parties’ use of sanctions through a nonbinding Assembly resolution would put the onus on the States Parties, rather
than the ICC, to enforce compliance. Unlike the ICC, States Parties have
enforcement mechanisms—through their military or police forces—to mandate compliance with these sanctions. Further, non-compliant states would
be much less willing to endanger political relationships with other states—
especially those that carry power on the geopolitical stage—than they would
be to harm their relationship with the ICC, which has no formal recourse.
Finally, such an approach would allow the ICC to frame one of its biggest
weaknesses—the pervasive role of politics in Court operations—in its favor.
Again, however, such a solution is not without limitations. In order for
States Parties to impose bilateral sanctions on non-compliant states, the ICC
first and foremost needs to inspire these States Parties to do so by improving
the ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Economic sanctions will also be most effectively utilized by those most powerful states, which have resisted the reach
321
of the ICC, such as the United States, Russia, and China. The ability of
less powerful nations to use bilateral sanctions to pressure non-compliant
states may not carry the same level of consequence. Moreover, this bilateral
sanction scheme would do little to enforce compliance from powerful and
wealthy non-States Parties, like the United States. The Rome Statute only
imposes a duty to cooperate on States Parties, leaving several of the permanent members of the Security Council free to refuse to cooperate with the
322
ICC without consequence.
However, despite these limitations, utilizing a State Party-sponsored enforcement mechanism for non-compliance will significantly improve the
perceived legitimacy of the ICC throughout the globe. It will send a powerful message that States Parties believe so strongly in the ICC that they are
willing to take geopolitical measures to support its operations. Not only will
these sanctions promote the ICC’s effectiveness and ensure greater compliance from investigated states, but they will further portray the ICC as a
strong and legitimate mechanism and mitigate reputational damage caused
by past incidents of non-compliance.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ICC will always elicit criticism, both from its States Parties and
those states who will eternally oppose the ICC. As an undeniably quasipolitical entity, the ICC can never hope to appease all states; history has
proven that it will be criticized when it chooses to pursue investigations as

321.
Id. at 1307 (noting that the United States’ decision to condition financial aid on
state compliance with the ICTY was so effective because of the United States’ power and financial wealth, and questioning whether other, less powerful states, could provide as effective
bilateral pressure).
322.
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well as when it declines to. As an entity designed to prosecute high ranking officials responsible for the worst crimes facing humanity, the ICC is
bound to make powerful enemies who carry loud voices on the geopolitical
stage. These enemies, like the leaders of Kenya and the Trump administration in the United States, have taken advantage of the ICC’s weaknesses by
effectively using anti-ICC propaganda and disinformation in complement
with a refusal to cooperate with investigations. This type of approach has
successfully worked to discredit the ICC and its Prosecutor and has rendered investigations impossible.
To effectively counteract the damage that propaganda wars have caused
to the ICC, there needs to be critical change. Yet, while fundamental modifications to the Prosecutor’s selection, investigation, and prosecutorial strategy are imperative, these changes alone will not solve the ICC’s problems.
Instead, the ICC must begin to think strategically and operate in a more
practical manner by promoting its work to the public at large, both within
and outside of States Parties, and adapting a stronger approach to enforcing
state compliance. These changes are critical as the ICC begins to investigate
politically charged and highly controversial situations, including those involving alleged crimes committed by the United States and Israeli nationals.
With problematic cases on the horizon, states’ leaders will not stop seeking
to destroy the legitimacy of the ICC. Instead, the ICC must adapt to better
defend itself.
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